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Introduction
By András Rácz, Senior Research Fellow at DGAP,  
and Milan Nič, Head of the Robert Bosch Center  
for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central  
Asia at DGAP 
The year 2020 was an unexpectedly turbulent one for the 
Russian Federation in terms of both domestic politics and 
foreign policy. The first wave of the COVID-19 pandem-
ic damaged Russia’s economy, already hit by low oil prices, 
and disrupted President Vladimir Putin’s political agen-
da. Domestically, the most visible aspect of this turbulence 
was a prolonged, somewhat messy process of constitution-
al change. 
Through a national vote that eventually took place on 
July 1, 2020, Putin secured an option to run for president 
beyond 2024 when his current mandate expires and re- 
arranged the existing power system in a way that could 
allow him to maintain control even if he leaves the Krem-
lin. The constitutional reform also emphasized the primacy 
of Russian law over international law, moving Russia fur-
ther away from multilateralism. It underscored the prima-
cy of Russia’s domestic agenda and the principle of national 
self-reliance over foreign policy and engagement with the 
international system, which is dominated by the West. 
Meanwhile, 2020 brought the further multi-vectorialization 
of Russian foreign policy, which is highly likely to continue 
in 2021. While cooperation with China has been progressing, 
the poisoning of leading opposition activist Alexei Navalny 
caused further strain to Moscow’s relationship with the Eu-
ropean Union. The increased political tensions resulted in 
the introduction of new sanctions and even called the com-
pletion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline – a collaboration of 
high symbolic value – into question. The US presidential 
elections held on November 3 resulted in the victory of Joe 
Biden. Under Biden’s administration, US policy on Russia is 
likely to be more consistent and tougher than in the past 
four years of his predecessor, Donald Trump.
Moscow’s long-term efforts to diversify its foreign policy 
portfolio, turn away from Europe, and build-up other part-
nerships and non-Western vectors in its diplomacy were 
the focus of DGAP’s Strategy Group on Russia in 2020. Its 
sessions were chaired by MP Manuel Sarrazin, a member of 
the Foreign Relations Committee of the German Bundestag.
Three	developments	justified	the	choice	of	this	focus	for	the	
Strategy Group one year ago:
1. Limited progress in diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving 
the	conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine
2. French President Emmanuel Macron’s initiative to 
improve France’s bilateral relations with Moscow  
(as a pretext to improve EU-Russia relations)
3. The German EU Presidency in the second half of 2020
 
In December 2019, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, 
and France met in Paris in the so-called Normandy Format 
–	the	first	such	meeting	in	three	years.	Although	no	break-
through was achieved, this meeting helped bring a lasting 
ceasefire	to	the	Donbass	and	established	a	roadmap	for	a	
follow-up summit. It also created conditions for a package 
deal in EU-brokered talks on the transit of Russian gas via 
Ukraine, which was signed between Moscow and Kyiv only 
days before the old contract expired on January 1, 2020. The 
Paris summit was considered to be a sign of Moscow’s prag-
matism and good will toward Germany and France. With-
out committing to any concessions over eastern Ukraine, 
Moscow was testing the extent to which major EU powers 
are	exhausted	with	the	conflict	in	the	Donbass	and	ready	to	
bargain over the gradual alleviation of EU sanctions in order 
to normalize their relations with Russia. At the same time, 
German diplomacy needed Moscow’s cooperation in its dip-
lomatic	process	to	contain	escalating	armed	conflict	in	Lib-
ya, which led to the high-level international conference in 
Berlin in January 2020 that was attended by all the main ex-
ternal actors. 
From a longer-term perspective, however, Moscow clear-
ly considers its relations with Europe much less import-
ant than it did a decade ago. Russia’s gradual reorientation 
of	its	foreign	policy	and	its	intensification	of	relations	with	
non-Western partners already started in the early 2010s. In 
the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 
onset	of	war	in	eastern	Ukraine,	these	processes	intensified	
as relations with the West cooled. 
The 2020 outbreak of the coronavirus brought disruption. 
The pandemic overshadowed many political processes and 
decisively influenced others. As mentioned above, Rus-
sia’s economy and political processes have been hit partic-
ularly hard by COVID-19. The virus had several effects on 
Russia’s foreign policy, too. In addition to generally compli-
cating	international	diplomacy,	the	first	wave	slowed	down	
the transformation of Russia’s domestic political landscape, 
which is also an issue of key importance for Moscow’s for-
eign partners. 
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Since the pandemic started raging within the Russian Fed-
eration, Moscow has taken the opportunity to conduct 
“coronavirus	diplomacy”	in	the	field	of	foreign	policy	–	of-
ten together with China. It poses as a country that is ready 
to help the “incapable” and “unprepared” West with med-
ical and protective equipment. As of late 2020, Russia has 
been actively promoting its own Sputnik V vaccine world-
wide in addition to starting a national vaccination program 
in December.
In its June 2020 meeting, the Strategy Group assessed the 
state of EU-Russia relations in light of recent developments, 
especially the commencement of Germany’s EU Presiden-
cy on July 1. According to Tatiana Romanova, an associate 
professor at St. Petersburg State University, the bitter alien-
ation of EU-Russia relations since 2014 has become the new 
normal, particularly as the crisis in Ukraine constitutes a 
lasting obstacle to any normalization of bilateral ties. Fur-
ther key hindrances are mutual sanctions, the situation in 
the	Middle	East,	the	lasting	influence	of	the	United	States	
on Europe, and the ongoing economic disengagement be-
tween the EU and Russia. As Romanova’s assessment came 
before the Navalny case, one can only agree that her fore-
cast of a lack of any perspective for a major improvement in 
bilateral relations was accurate. 
An update on perspectives for EU-Russia relations after the 
Navalny poisoning is provided by Sarah Pagung, associate 
fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations. She ar-
gues that the Navalny case was a catalyst for the mistrust 
that had already built up between Europe and Russia. It thus 
marked the end of any kind of special relationship between 
the two – and with Germany, in particular – for the fore-
seeable future. The strategic partnership still promoted by 
French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019 has been fully 
replaced by a policy of mutual sanctions. This is unlikely to 
change anytime soon. As Russia does not perceive the Eu-
ropean Union as a serious foreign policy player, it does not 
even strive to improve its relations with the EU – no matter 
how much key EU leaders and institutions try. This situa-
tion leaves the EU with only one realistic option: consider-
ably strengthening its own foreign policy, security, and even 
defense policy while not falling into the trap of selective en-
gagement on a purely bilateral level, which would help Mos-
cow to divide member states.
Because Russia’s efforts to set its foreign policy on in-
creasingly multi-vectorial ground have been largely fo-
cused on China, the September session of the Strategy 
Group was dedicated to this topic. Hence, two chapters of 
1  A pseudonym for a leading Russian expert on China, who preferred not to publish under a real name.
this report deal with the perspectives for further intensi-
fying Russia-China relations. Independent expert Natalia 
Chabarovskaya1 argues that both trade and energy relations 
demonstrate the increasingly asymmetric relationship be-
tween Moscow and Beijing, clearly favoring the latter. She 
sees technology and the military as the most promising 
and	mutually	beneficial	fields	for	bilateral	cooperation.	Al-
though Moscow and Beijing share opinions on many inter-
national issues, she points out that they are careful not to 
become entangled in each other’s complicated positions on 
the global stage. In his chapter, Niklas Swanström, direc-
tor of the Institute for Security and Development Policy in 
Stockholm, looks at this relationship from the Chinese side 
and comes to a similar conclusion: in terms of geopolitics, 
the current constellation provides what both Moscow and 
Beijing actually want. Strategic collaboration in technology 
and around the digital economy is mostly driven by China, 
but there are important exceptions. In the area of robotics, 
as well as in some arms and missile systems, Russian tech-
nology is still ahead – at least for a few more years. Given 
the shortage of Russian resources for research and innova-
tion, it is merely a matter of time before China catches up. 
Aware	of	this	limited	window	for	profit,	Moscow	recently	
reduced restrictions on sensitive arms sales to Beijing and 
increased joint production of the latest military technolo-
gy. Meanwhile, China sees learning from Russian experience 
with military combat, cyber operations, and disinformation 
campaigns as an increasingly valuable asset. 
The last two chapters, written in November, are dedicat-
ed to the foreseeable future of US-Russia relations following 
the election of President Joe Biden. Angela Stent, direc-
tor of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East Europe-
an Studies of Georgetown University, argues that, while 
trying to forecast US-Russia relations in the Biden era, one 
first needs to remember that there will be plenty of con-
tinuity in the Russia agendas of the US administrations, as 
well as lasting personal continuity on the Russian side. The 
Biden administration will put major emphasis on the New 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and recom-
mit the United States to the Paris Accords to counter cli-
mate change. The Artic may serve as an area of possible 
US-Russia	cooperation,	as	may	the	fight	against	COVID-19,	
particularly if the United States rejoins the World Health 
Organization. Stent notes that every new US administration 
since 1992 has tried its own “reset” with Russia, but all of 
these efforts ended with disappointing results. 
According to Andrey Kortunov, director general of the Rus-
sian International Affairs Council, the Biden administra-
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tion may follow a mixed policy vis-à-vis Russia. He argues 
that, on some issues – particularly, nuclear arms control – 
relations may actually become more pragmatic than they 
were under President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, in other 
fields,	Washington	is	likely	to	play	hardball	against	Moscow,	
for example, in Russia’s neighborhood. Besides, the Unit-
ed States will probably continue to put pressure on China, 
which may well result in a “dual containment” policy aimed 
against both Moscow and Beijing.
The final chapter includes an update on how Russia has 
been dealing with the pandemic at the end of 2020, plus 
some lessons learned from the year’s Strategy Group 
sessions. 
One of the main takeaways is that, although 2020 has been 
hard and resulted in further deterioration of EU-Russia re-
lations, 2021 is unlikely to be any better. There are four main 
reasons for this: 
• First and foremost, Moscow is no longer interested in 
maintaining good relations with the West, including 
Europe. Russian leaders – and security services that play 
a dominant role in decision-making – continue to focus 
on hard security matters and consider Europe to be a 
weaker partner. They are unwilling to make any conces-
sions	on	the	conflict	in	Donbass	or	any	other	regional	
issues that are important for Europeans. Also, they 
remain convinced that the West has entered a period of 
irreversible decline and, consequently, that time is on 
their side. 
• Second, the new US administration is likely to conduct a 
tougher, more coherent foreign policy vis-à-vis Moscow, 
in particular in the aftermath of the recently discovered 
and not yet fully understood hacking attacks against US 
governmental servers in 2020. Such an approach will 
induce similar Russian counterreactions. Still, such pol-
icy may, over time, be more predictable than that of the 
Trump era. It may even lead to more cooperation in areas 
of mutual interest, e.g. climate change. In the short term, 
however, this predictability is likely to mean steadily cold 
relations, in which cooperation will be limited to only the 
most urgent issues, in particular, arms control. 
• Third, the case of Alexei Navalny – his poisoning and 
especially his recent detainment in Russia – will pre-
vent the EU and Germany from moving toward more 
dialogue and selective engagement. In other words, the 
EU is unlikely to make any concessions. Also, due to the 
upcoming Duma elections, the Kremlin cannot afford 
to look weak by making a compromise either. Thus, fur-
ther diplomatic pressure and even sanctions from the 
EU are in the cards. Over time, and as long as the EU 
retains its unity toward Russia, this could lead to more 
engagement and bargaining with the Kremlin – also on 
European terms. In Moscow, Germany is still seen as the 
main interlocutor for the EU; a new chancellor will be 
seen as “somebody to talk to” and present an opening for 
repairing the relationship. While the interim period until 
Germany’s parliamentary elections in fall 2021 should 
be used to develop soft topics and a forward-looking 
agenda, it would be naïve to expect that the “old topics” 
will simply go away. 
• Fourth, from Russia’s perspective, its increasingly strong 
cooperation with China – as well as with Turkey and 
other powers – is indeed bearing fruit. Therefore, Mos-
cow is likely to continue to multi-vectorialize its foreign 
policy and trade. Russia will also use this multi-vectori-
alization to demonstrate less dependence on the West 
in a world in which global power relations are rapidly 
shifting. 
Of course, these factors do not mean that Germany’s limited 
engagement with Russia will become impossible – particu-
larly	on	issues	of	mutual	interest,	such	as	fighting	COVID-19	
and climate change. It will, however, be important to avoid 
cross-topic concessions. Progress on issues related to com-
bating the pandemic, cooperating on vaccines, or tackling 
climate change should not result in Germany weakening its 
support for human rights, democratic values, and region-
al issues.
Both authors would like to express special thanks to Alena 
Epifanova, researcher and program manager, as well as 
Marina Solntseva, project assistant at DGAP’s Robert Bosch 
Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central 
Asia, for their continuous support and important input to the 
Strategy Group on Russia project.  
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of the German 
EU Presidency
By Tatiana Romanova, Associate Professor
at Saint Petersburg University
A NEW NORMAL INSTEAD OF “BUSINESS 
AS USUAL”
At present,2 EU-Russian relations are characterized by bit-
ter alienation, which has become the new normal. The EU’s 
occasional statements about not returning to “business 
as usual” until Russia changes its policies (in particular, in 
Ukraine) are met by lack of interest from the side of Russian 
representatives in that “business as usual.” The EU expects 
relations to eventually return to the pattern by which Rus-
sia was to become similar to the EU through reforms; this 
return is mostly associated with internal transformations 
in	Russia.	For	their	part,	officials	in	Moscow	await	a	funda-
mental overhaul of the relationship, believing that current 
global turbulence is transforming everything, including the 
domination of the West. Conceptual discussions between 
the EU and Russia on key issues – including the rules-based 
order and multilateralism, as well as the interpretation of 
history, especially that of the Second World War – will re-
main acute. No resolution of these debates is in sight.
Divergent assumptions have caused the EU and Russia to 
adopt a wait-and-see attitude, with occasional attempts at 
“selective engagement” and resilience (in the EU’s jargon) or 
“pragmatic cooperation” on the basis of “equality” (as Rus-
sia prefers to call it). Yet, none of these categories enables a 
medium-term, let alone long-term, policy. The scope of se-
lective engagement/pragmatic cooperation has never been 
2  This chapter was finished in May 2020. It thus reflects the situation of EU-Russia relations at that time.
3  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Press release on the meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” May 25, 2018: 
<https://www.mid.ru/en/magate/-/asset_publisher/km9HkaXMTium/content/id/3234684> (accessed December 2, 2020).
delineated. Resilience to Russia-related threats is used to 
describe varying EU policies from isolation to more trans-
national engagement – for example, in business and civ-
il society. Russia does not specify what equality means in 
practice. Mutual trust remains at a record low.
The ongoing crises related to COVID-19 did not change 
these dynamics in favor of more cooperation to counter 
common threats. Instead, we have seen more of the same: 
mutual allegations of disinformation, accusations of Rus-
sia-led cyberattacks, critique of the disrespect for Russian/
Soviet memorials, and mutual economic disengagement to 
cite only a few examples. Russia’s attempts to improve its 
public image in the EU through medical assistance to Italy 
during the spring 2020 COVID-19 pandemic hardly changed 
the situation; rather, it provoked more critique that Russia 
was waging an information war, conducting intelligence op-
erations, and seeking to promote disunity in the EU. Mos-
cow was also unsuccessful in its attempts to exploit the 
COVID-19 pandemic to relax the sanction regime.
FOREIGN POLICY FACTORS HAMPERING 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF EU-RUSSIA 
RELATIONS
Globally, the United States remains the key player for Rus-
sia in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defense. Rus-
sia’s primary security concern is the erosion of arms control 
where Washington is the key interlocutor. In the meantime, 
the EU’s security and defense ambitions remain modest. 
French President Emmanuel Macron’s plans of closer (se-
curity) cooperation between the EU and Russia are praised 
in Moscow, but they do not look credible in the absence of 
wide EU backing. Moreover, they implicitly assign Russia the 
role of junior partner to the EU while lecturing Moscow on 
its interests, which also provokes a negative reaction. In ad-
dition, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 
Iran clearly demonstrates that no deal survives in the ab-
sence of US support,3 further undermining the EU’s politi-
cal attractiveness to Russia. Because Russia remains a toxic 
topic in the United States, US-Russian relations are unlike-
ly to fundamentally change. This constellation, in turn, al-
so prevents any major development in EU-Russian relations.
Improvement of EU-Russian relations is also blocked by the 
conflict in Ukraine, which is a reflection of wider securi-
ty	debates	in	Europe.	As	the	costs	of	the	conflict	are	piling	
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up, both Moscow and Kyiv seem interested in advancing a 
partial solution. For Russia, implementation of the Decem-
ber 2019 Normandy Summit’s decisions4 is a precondition 
for any further discussion. But, so far, only prisoners have 
been	exchanged	and	the	ceasefire	is	still	only	partially	re-
spected. Fierce debates on the modalities of the implemen-
tation of any decision severely limit Ukrainian President 
Volodymyr Zelensky internally. Some hopes are linked to the 
changed membership of the Contact Group on both Rus-
sian and Ukrainian sides and to a new consultative mecha-
nism, which includes German and French representatives, 
thus legitimizing respective discussions in Ukraine. Yet, 
progress will be piecemeal as the positions of both sides are 
entrenched.
The situation in the wider Middle East will continue to im-
pact EU-Russian relations in a non-constructive way. Ten-
sion in the Idlib region of Syria, which escalated between 
Russia and Turkey in February 2020, forced Turkish Presi-
dent	Recep	Tayyip	Erdogan	to	unblock	refugee	flows	to	the	
EU.	The	fear	of	a	new	massive	influx	of	migrants	to	Europe	
was short-lived this time as Russia and Turkey reached an 
agreement,	and	the	EU	confirmed	its	funding	to	Turkey.	Yet,	
the	conflict	between	forces	led	by	Syrian	President	Bashar	
el-Assad and supported by Russia and opposition groups 
(including extremist ones) that are backed by Turkey is like-
ly	to	intensify	again	with	a	potential	new	influx	of	illegal	mi-
grants to the EU. Libya is another point to watch; there, the 
EU plays a more active role but any settlement is far away.
ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT
EU-Russian economic disengagement is crucial. From 2013 
to 2019, the EU’s exports to Russia decreased by 27.1 billion 
EUR while imports fell by 54.6 billion EUR.5 EU sanctions 
and Russia’s countersanctions have destroyed previous-
ly existing interdependence, in many cases for good. Con-
sequently,	Russia’s	trade	diversification	toward	Asia,	which	
had started well before 2014, has intensified. On the EU’s 
side, the biggest disengagement factor is energy. Concerns 
about Russia led to the diversification of gas supply. The 
EU’s energy transition is marketed as a way to ease its de-
pendence on Russia. Much will depend on how the Green 
Deal will be shaped in 2020. Will Russia and its gas play a 
role, thus moving relations into a new gear, or will they be 
left aside? In light of these questions, the controversial de-
velopments around the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are sec-
4  President of Russia, “Paris ‘Normandy’ Summit Common Agreed Conclusions,” December 9, 2019: <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5465> (accessed December 2, 2020).
5  European Commission, “European Union, Trade in goods with Russia,” February 1, 2020:  
<https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_russia_en.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2020).
ondary. The economic consequences of the pandemic will 
further negatively affect economic relations. As a result, 
EU-Russian economic interdependence, which has long 
provided a safety net for EU-Russian relations, will gradu-
ally disappear. 
The effect of sanctions on the EU and Russia is limited but 
negative, with costs piling up as time goes on. The Russian 
economy has stabilized following the increase in oil prices 
after 2014. Still, sanctions have decreased Russian economic 
growth by at least 0.2 percent annually. Limits on the access 
to capital and technological transfers from the West could 
reduce Russian GDP by 9 percent in the long term. The cur-
rent pandemic has already resulted in some economic reces-
sion	and	the	devaluation	of	the	ruble;	accelerated	inflation	
and constrained economic growth are sure to follow. 
Strained US-Russia relations remain decisive in shaping Rus-
sia’s economic relations with the European Union too, irre-
spective of the EU being Russia’s biggest trade partner. US 
secondary sanctions will deter EU companies from dealing 
with Russia even if (or when) the EU decides to use restrictive 
measures	in	a	more	flexible	way,	i.e.	by	lifting	some	of	them.
Losses and gains from economic restrictions are unevenly 
spread. Losses in Russia were incurred by both citizens and 
small	and	medium-sized	enterprises	(SMEs).	Food	inflation	
accelerated while the quality of some products depreciated; 
agricultural import substitution costs every Russian citizen 
3,000 RUB annually. Yet sanctions led to massive programs 
of import substitution (including in equipment used in oil 
and gas production) and to budgetary allocations to the 
military industry. Russian farmers benefited from coun-
tersanctions with Russia ensuring its food security. These 
stakeholders are now interested in preserving sanctions. 
Similarly,	there	are	opinions	that	the	Russian	financial	mar-
ket could suffer if sanctions are removed too swiftly. From 
2014 to 2018, the EU lost about 0.2 percent of GDP because 
of Russian restrictive measures. These losses are unevenly 
distributed among member states.
MUTUAL LACK OF TRUST AND SOCIETAL 
INTERACTION
EU-Russian relations are strongly affected by new threats, 
including disinformation and cyberattacks, which reflect 
the breadth of transnational contacts and the importance of 
Russian Foreign Policy in 2020: Strengthening Multi-vectorialism
9No. 5 | January 2021
REPORT
new technologies. Accusations of disinformation are harsh 
on both sides. Parties are concerned about the potential 
destabilization of their internal processes, paying less at-
tention to the differentiation between fake news and ex-
pressing opinions. The problem became more acute during 
the pandemic. Russia is also regularly accused of cyberat-
tacks but refutes these accusations on the basis that the ev-
idence	provided	is	insufficient	and	that	the	alleged	hackers	
have nothing to do with the state. Any international legal 
solution to the problem is far from reach. The atmosphere 
of mistrust exacerbates the problem. In these circumstanc-
es, the timing when relevant incidents are made public, the 
amount of evidence that is requested and furnished, as well 
as responses that are adopted, remain of crucial political 
importance.
The lack of social interaction contributes to poor relations. 
Civil society contacts are limited due to the skeptical at-
titude of Russia, the need to obtain visas, and costs of in-
ternational travel. The pandemic further exacerbated this 
problem, making socialization among people even more 
limited. Under these circumstances, people on both sides 
remain easy targets of opinion manipulation and disinfor-
mation. In the EU, positive views of Russia currently range 
from 12 percent (Swedes) to 73 percent (Bulgarians) with 
the EU’s average at around 31 percent.6 In Russia, howev-
er, opinion polls have recorded a growth of positive attitude 
to the EU among Russian citizens (from 32 percent in Jan-
uary 2018 to 49 percent in January 2020),7 which illustrates 
that anti-Western stances are ceding their position to more 
mundane demands for economic growth. 
FURTHER DISENGAGEMENT DUE TO THE 
COVID-19 PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 pandemic will have a huge economic impact 
on both the EU and Russia. Their responses are different 
and will indirectly affect their relations. Russia preferred to 
respond to the current health crisis with regulative mea-
sures with limited distribution from the state budget. De-
preciated standards of living and higher unemployment 
have drastically decreased Russian President Vladimir 
Putin’s approval rating. This is one reason why the Kremlin 
is hurrying to hold the public vote on constitutional chang-
es that will, among other things, open a possibility for Putin 
to make another run for the presidency. But the Rus-
sian regime seems to underestimate societal sentiments. 
6  Pew Research Center, “Russia and Putin receive low ratings globally,” February 7, 2020:  
<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/russia-and-putin-receive-low-ratings-globally/> (accessed December 2, 2020).
7  Levada Center, “Otnosheniye k stranam” [Attitude to countries], February 18, 2020:  
<https://www.levada.ru/2020/02/18/otnoshenie-k-stranam-6/> (accessed December 2, 2020).
Massive unrest is not in sight, but crime rates are going up 
and the voice of those advocating stability in Russia is weak-
ening. Economic recovery and solidarity will remain the 
EU’s biggest concern, distracting it from Russia. EU national 
recovery measures have been widely debated in Russia and 
are contrasted with those adopted by Moscow. Suggested 
EU-level	reforms	to	finance	the	recovery	consolidate	the	in-
tegration process; their success will affect the EU’s credibil-
ity and attractiveness as an economic partner in the eyes of 
the Russians. Yet, none of these changes point in the direc-
tion of a foreign policy change in Russia.
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Facing the  
Reality
By Sarah Pagung, Associate Fellow
of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
The poisoning of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny 
in August 2020 again caused a visible worsening of EU-Russia 
relations. The EU implemented sanctions against six Russian 
individuals as well as a state research institute that October. 
Russia answered by sanctioning French and German govern-
ment	officials.	But	the	diplomatic	crisis	following	the	Navalny	
case is only a symptom of a development that already started 
in 2019.8 As Germany grew disillusioned over Moscow’s han-
dling of the 2019 murder in Berlin’s Kleiner Tiergarten park, 
France was disappointed over the failure of its reset policy 
with Russia. Despite this change in attitude among its leading 
nations, the EU’s Russia policy remains contradictive and lim-
ited in its capacity to act. Sanctions are of moderate impact9 
and EU policy is undermined by projects such as Nord Stream 
2	or	Hungary’s	flirt	with	Russia’s	illiberal	policy.	
THE END OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
After a German Bundeswehr laboratory confirmed that 
Navalny was poisoned by the nerve agent Novichok, Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel strongly condemned this attack and 
demanded investigations by Russian authorities.10 As Merkel 
is known for careful and prudent language, this clear state-
8  This chapter was finished in December 2020. It thus reflects the situation of EU-Russia relations at that time.
9  Dr. Alan Riley, “Impact and Effectiveness: Sanctions on Russia 2014–2020,” Henry Jackson Society, December 2020:  
<https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/russia-sanctions/> (accessed December 11, 2020).
10  Iain Rogers, Raymond Colitt, Patrick Donahue, “Merkel Demands Kremlin Answer After Poison Found in Navalny,” Bloomberg, August 24, 2020:  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-24/merkel-demands-kremlin-answer-after-poison-found-in-putin-critic> (accessed December 11, 2020).
11  Vladimir Esipov, “Death in Berlin: Russian goes on trial for murder of exiled Chechen,” Deutsche Welle, July 10, 2020:  
<https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-russia-murder-chechen-dissident/a-55165044> (accessed December 11, 2020).
12  “Russland hat nie einen Auslieferungsantrag gestellt” [Russia never submitted an extradition request], Zeit Online, December 19, 2019:  
<https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-12/mord-kleiner-tiergarten-russland-wladimir-putin-auslieferungsantrag> (accessed December 11, 2020).
13  Claire Demesmay, Milan Nič, “Macron Looks East,” DGAP Commentary, October 2, 2020:  
<https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/macron-looks-east> (accessed December 11, 2020).
14  Andrew S. Weiss, “Russia and Europe: Stuck on Autopilot,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 24, 2020:  
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/24/russia-and-europe-stuck-on-autopilot-pub-82773> (accessed December 11, 2020).
ment attracted national and international attention. Previ-
ously, in May 2020, Merkel also clearly denounced a Russian 
cyberattack on the German Bundestag that took place in 
2015. This change in rhetoric is the result of the so-called 
Tiergarten murder in 2019. In August 2019, the Russian cit-
izen	Vadim	Krasikov	killed	the	former	field	commander	of	
the	Chechen	conflict	Zelimkhan	Khangoshvili	in	broad	day-
light in a Berlin public park. The indictment of Germany’s 
Federal	Prosecutor’s	Office	accused	Russian	secret	services	
of ordering and assisting in the murder.11 After the attack, 
Berlin sought the help of Russian authorities in the inves-
tigation and – unlike the UK in the Skripal case – did not 
accuse or criticize the Russian state publicly. Instead of of-
fering cooperation, Moscow’s answer consisted of denials 
and the false accusation that Berlin refused to work with 
Russian authorities.12 Germany had to learn that its close 
diplomatic ties and special relationship was not of any val-
ue in this crisis. Merkel’s bold speech following the Navalny 
case in 2020 is the consequence of this failure.
FROM STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP  
TO SANCTION POLICY
In June 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron announced 
a new strategic partnership with Russia, establishing a so-
called structured dialogue with several working groups. The 
French approach of “strategic dialogue and firmness” mir-
rored the core aspect of Former EU High Representative 
Federica Mogherini’s principles of selective engagement.13 
Macron wanted to revive EU-Russia relations as sanction pol-
icy after the Ukraine crisis had not produced any change in 
the Russian regime’s behavior.14 But the initiative failed to pro-
duce any results as French Defense Minister Florence Parly 
admitted in July 2020. It did, however, cause alienation among 
France’s European partners. In particular, Central Eastern Eu-
ropean countries and the Baltic states considered the ini-
tiative as a bilateral forum to discuss multilateral issues that 
are their core security interests. After Navalny was poisoned, 
France paused the dialogue with Russia and instead, together 
with Berlin, drove new EU sanctions against Russia.
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NEW REALITIES
Both France and Germany had come to realize that their ap-
proaches toward Russia failed. Like the EU in general, they 
missed the chance to adapt to new realities in relations be-
tween	Russia	and	the	Union	and,	more	specifically,	in	the	
post-Soviet space. In 2016, in reaction to the Ukraine crisis, 
the EU agreed on the so-called Mogherini Principles, which 
essentially represent a mix of containment and engagement. 
Nevertheless,	the	past	five	years	have	shown	that	possible	
cases for engagement rarely lead to a situation that can be 
described as minimal rather than selective engagement. In 
areas where the EU and Russia have interests, these either 
contradict each other – like in the Common Neighborhood 
and Libya – or, despite having common interests – like in 
the Iranian nuclear deal – both parties ultimately lack the 
leverage to enforce them. 
Moreover, Russia is not interested in building long-term al-
liances as this is perceived as a weakening of national sov-
ereignty. Instead, Russia prioritizes short-term tactical 
advantages as illustrated by the disinformation campaign 
against Macron during the French presidential election or 
against Germany in the Kleiner Tiergarten murder case. 
Both France and Germany have been strong advocates for 
good relations with Moscow for decades. But Russia in-
creasingly affronts these two powers. Now, Moscow mainly 
relies on two types of states within the EU to further its in-
terests:	either	states	like	Hungary	that	are	in	conflict	with	
Brussels and rely on Russia for balancing purposes, or states 
like Cyprus that do have close economic and political ties 
with	Moscow	and,	thus,	can	be	made	useful	through	influ-
ence and corruption.
RUSSIA DOES NOT SEE THE EU AS A 
SERIOUS PLAYER
The recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh has further illustrat-
ed new realities in the Common Neighborhood. While the 
EU lacks the power and will to engage in the South Cau-
casus, Russia’s foreign policy has evolved to be more ma-
ture and effective. Moscow’s foreign policy has become less 
based	on	aggressive	influence	and	proxy	wars	and	more	on	
efficiently	calibrating	and	instrumentalizing	power	balances	
in its neighborhood. When the EU and Armenia signed the 
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement in 
15  Felix Eick, Philipp Veter, “Für die Wasserstoff-Strategie braucht Altmaier noch mehr Gas aus Russland” [Altmaier needs even more gas from Russia for the hydrogen 
strategy], Die Welt, February 18, 2020:  
<https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article205966173/Nord-Stream-2-Altmaier-setzt-auch-fuer-Wasserstoff-auf-russisches-Erdgas.html> (accessed December 11, 2020).
16  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Hungary To Test Russian Coronavirus Vaccine,” November 23, 2020:  
<https://www.rferl.org/a/hungary-to-test-russian-coronavirus-vaccine/30965120.html> (accessed December 11, 2020).
2017, Moscow did not object. Armenia seemed to walk a path 
between Russia and the EU, closely cooperating with and 
benefiting	from	both	of	them.	But	after	Azerbaijan	attacked	
the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh held by Armenian forc-
es, the country’s dependence on Russia was unmissable. De-
spite	a	conflict	driven	by	support	by	Turkey	for	Azerbaijan,	
Moscow maintained the escalation dominance in the re-
gion. In contrast, the EU did not play any crucial role. There 
are two reasons for this. First, against the backdrop of the 
COVID-19	pandemic	and	internal	conflict	on	the	rule	of	law	
and migration, the EU lacks both the political will to engage 
and concepts on how to engage. Second, even with politi-
cal will and concepts, the EU does not have the leverage to 
implement its interests. Just like in Syria or Libya, its lack of 
military power constitutes a serious obstacle. Hence, Rus-
sia, as a realist power, does not accept the EU as a serious 
player with whom to engage in bargaining. 
TRAPPED IN CONTRADICTIONS
Russia rightly interprets Europe’s foreign policy as weak. 
Macron’s offer for a strategic dialogue and Germany’s soft 
attitude after the Tiergarten murder are perceived as signs 
of this weakness – as is the EU’s limited capacity to act de-
cisively, forcefully, and unanimously. For Moscow, the for-
eign policy of the EU and its member states toward Russia is 
trapped in contractions. Germany strongly condemns Rus-
sia’s strongman policy in Ukraine, Syria, or Libya, but, at 
the same time, it holds on to Nord Stream 2, thereby effec-
tively undermining the EU’s policy toward Ukraine as well 
as European cohesion in general. Despite international and 
national criticism against the project, German Federal Min-
ister for Economic Affairs and Energy Peter Altmaier even 
strives to include the pipeline in Germany’s plan to gener-
ate energy from hydrogen.15 In November, shortly after the 
EU implemented sanctions against Russia over the Navalny 
case, Hungary started contemplating testing Russia’s 
COVID-19 vaccine Sputnik V.16 So far, Russia has not pub-
lished	sufficient	scientific	data	on	its	efficiency	and	it	fac-
es massive problems in its mass production. Nevertheless, 
Moscow uses the vaccine as a propaganda tool and spreads 
news about its alleged effectiveness. 
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EU SANCTION POLICY LACKS CLOUT
In addition to recognizing the inconsistencies in the EU’s 
inter- and intrastate policy, Moscow does not see the EU as 
a strong foreign policy player in terms of institutional setup. 
This is not only caused by the lack of military power and the 
aforementioned contradictions in the Union’s policy, but al-
so in the political structure of the European Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP). The condition of unanimity 
seriously restricts the EU’s ability to act. 
Even if EU member states can agree on measures unan-
imously and swiftly, the policy lacks clout – as recent EU 
policies illustrate. In December 2020, the EU agreed on a 
common sanction regime targeting individuals and enti-
ties violating human rights all over the world through as-
set freezes and visa bans.17 This is a reaction not only to the 
Navalny case but also to other incidents, such as the as-
sassination of the dissident Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Ara-
bian agents in 2018. However, while individual sanctions 
have a strong symbolic power, the Russian case shows that 
their effect is limited as they do not impose high costs on 
the regime. Regarding Russia, while individuals and enti-
ties on European sanction lists are adding up, their loyalty 
to the regime persists; moreover, in fact, their dependency 
on Moscow increases as the gates to the West are closed in 
front of them. 
All in all, the strategy of sanctioning individuals is rath-
er a result of bargaining among EU member states, many 
of whom shy away from harsher economic sanctions due 
to their potentially harmful effects on Europe itself.18 This 
illustrates the limited belief in the possibility of achieving 
foreign policy objectives with this instrument while obtain-
ing	an	acceptable	cost-benefit	parity.	
THE EU MUST TAKE THE PRINCIPLE OF 
SELECTIVE ENGAGEMENT SERIOUSLY
For the EU, three major recommendations for action can 
be derived from this situation. First, in the medium to 
long term, the EU has to improve its CSFP decision-mak-
ing process by abolishing the unanimity vote. Besides en-
suring faster decision-making, such a move could make it 
much harder for Russia – or for any other external actor – 
to block or hamper EU decision-making via its proxies with-
in the European Union. Second, it has to improve its will 
17  Michael Peel, “EU agrees law to sanction human rights abusers,” Financial Times, December 7, 2020:  
<https://www.ft.com/content/20df57a1-1d9a-4431-962e-eb7570ddb237> (accessed December 11, 2020).
18  Clara Portela, Paulina Pospieszna, Joanna Skrzypczyńska, Dawid Walentek, “Consensus against all odds: explain the persistence of EU sanctions on Russia,” Journal of 
European Integration, August 2020: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07036337.2020.1803854?needAccess=true> (accessed December 14, 2020).
and resources to wield classical hard power, especially mili-
tary power, in its eastern and southern neighborhood. Only 
if it does will Russia heed the EU. Third, and most impor-
tantly, the EU needs to take its own principle of selective 
engagement seriously. Engaging with Moscow only makes 
sense if there are overlapping interests and political will 
on both sides to compromise. Otherwise, Moscow is either 
taking advantage of Europe’s will to compromise, as the cas-
es of Nord Stream 2 and the Tiergarten murder have illus-
trated, or Moscow lets initiatives run into the void, as it did 
with the French strategic dialogue. 
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By Natalia Chabarovskaya,19 an independent expert on 
Russia-China relations 
Since 2014, China and Russia have referred to each other as 
strategic partners, highlighting the special status of their 
relationship. There have been impressive achievements in 
various spheres and their relationship has deepened over 
the years, yet the magnitude of their cooperation is far 
more modest than it is often portrayed. Despite their pro-
claimed friendship, there are clear limitations20 to what both 
countries are willing to commit to their partnership. Some 
parts of the relationship are driven by practical and even 
transactional motives. In others, different interests and a 
lack of trust restrict Russia and China from moving toward a 
quasi-	or	even	full-fledged	alliance.	
GROWING ASYMMETRY IN  
BILATERAL TRADE
Asymmetry in favor of China can be found in almost every 
part of the Sino-Russian relationship. In the majority of cas-
es, this is partially due to a shortsighted attitude in Russia. 
Moscow neglected cooperation with Beijing for far too long 
and started its “turn to the East” only when its options on 
the	international	stage	became	limited	after	the	2008	finan-
cial crisis and then the introduction of Western sanctions in 
2014. This myopia toward cooperation with China that un-
derlined Russia’s attitude toward its eastern neighbor for 
years	also	inflated	the	Kremlin’s	expectations	from	this	turn.	
Moscow	has	hoped	for	a	flow	of	“easy	money”	from	Beijing,	
but these hopes were quickly shattered by Beijing’s practical 
attitude toward economic cooperation. 
19 A pseudonym for a leading Russian expert on China who preferred not to publish under a real name.
20  This chapter was finished in September 2020. It thus reflects the situation of Russia-China relations at that time.
21  “Bilateral trade between Russian Federation and China,” Trade Map, 2019:  
<https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c643%7c%7c156%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1> (accessed December 2, 2020).
Trade between China and Russia demonstrates the overar-
ching	asymmetry	in	their	relationship	and	reflects	the	prac-
tical nature of their economic cooperation. Agricultural 
exports to China form the most promising sector for Rus-
sia but, in order to be successful, Russian exporters have to 
cope with the competitiveness of the Chinese market. 
The Sino-Russian trade turnover started to grow steadily 
after 2009 and China became Russia’s largest trading part-
ner in 2010. Russia, however, has so far not made it onto the 
list of China’s top ten trade partners. Almost 70 percent of 
its exports to China are hydrocarbons, while China supplies 
it with mostly high-end machinery and electronics.21 This 
composition of their bilateral trade affects the trade volume 
in currency terms: for example, the drop in oil prices in 2015 
and subsequent free fall of the ruble exchange rate led to 
a 28.6 percent decrease in the value of Russia’s exports to 
China that year. 
RUSSIA-CHINA TRADE TURNOVER 
(BILLIONS USD)
Source: Trade Map, 2019
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Russia is seeking to diversify its exports to China with ag-
ricultural goods and food products, yet Russian produc-
ers only started looking at the Chinese market after 2014, 
which was much too late. Their interest was largely based 
on a heightened expectation of the size of China’s food mar-
ket. However, as soon as Russian food producers (mainly of 
dairy,	meat,	and	sweets)	took	their	first	steps	in	the	Chinese	
market,	they	faced	fierce	competition	from	Western	brands	
with a well-established presence in the country. They real-
ized that they had to tailor their products to the tastes of 
Chinese customers to carve out their niche.  
In general, the trends in Sino-Russian trade can be ex-
plained with market logic. Geopolitics enters this dimension 
of the relationship only when it comes to the promotion of 
the two national currencies in mutual trade settlements. 
In June 2019, after long talks and postponements, Mos-
cow and Beijing signed an agreement on promoting trade 
settlements in their national currencies. At the end of the 
first	quarter	of	2020,	the	share	of	the	US	dollar	in	their	bi-
lateral trade settlements fell below 50 percent (to 46 per-
cent)	for	the	first	time.	Yet,	the	share	of	the	US	dollar	was	
partially taken over by the euro: its share increased up to 
53.1 percent. The performance of their respective curren-
cies	is	more	modest	and	reflects	the	trade	asymmetry:	the	
renminbi’s share of bilateral trade settlements was almost 
25	percent	in	the	first	quarter	of	2020,	while	the	ruble	ac-
counted for just 5.2 percent. 
ENERGY COOPERATION DOMINATED  
BY CHINA
Energy cooperation in the last ten years reveals the neg-
ative consequences of Russia’s decades-long neglect of its 
economic relationship with China. The dynamic here makes 
clear Beijing’s upper hand and practical approach to eco-
nomic ties. 
Russia started to look for Chinese money for energy proj-
ects	after	2008,	when	China	had	already	diversified	its	en-
ergy supplies and had a stronger position in negotiations. 
Amid the recession and rapidly decreasing internation-
al	demand	for	commodities	during	the	global	financial	cri-
sis, the Russian energy giants Rosneft and Transneft had 
to	turn	to	China	to	finance	the	East	Siberia-Pacific	Ocean	
22  Forbes, “Russia and China Strike a Deal,” November 2, 2009:  
<https://www.forbes.com/2009/10/30/russia-china-banks-business-oxford-analytica.html?sh=145687f8298f> (accessed December 2, 2020).
23  Olga Tanas et al., “How Russia-China Gas Pipeline Changes Energy Calculus,” Bloomberg, November 25, 2019:  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-25/how-russia-china-gas-pipeline-changes-energy-calculus-quicktake#:~:text=Putin%20has%20said%20that%20
gas,Germany%2C%20according%20to%20Russian%20officials> (accessed December 2, 2020). 
24  Ria Novosti, “Gazprom postroit gazoprovod ‘Sila Sibiri’ za schet svoikh sobstvennykh sredstv” [Gazprom will build the Power of Siberia pipeline with its own funds], June 26, 
2015: <https://ria.ru/20150626/1090108945.html> (accessed December 2, 2020).
pipeline project, as there were no options in the West, 
which was dealing with its own economic problems. Bei-
jing was aware of Moscow’s lack of alternative and skillful-
ly leveraged it. Despite the risk of creating a monopsony in 
the East, Rosneft and Transneft signed a contract with the 
China National Petroleum Corporation in 2009,22 commit-
ting to build a direct pipeline to China. In exchange, Chi-
na Development Bank provided the two Russian companies 
with a 25 billion USD loan, which was backed by a 20-year 
oil-supply contract. In 2011, when the pipeline’s branch that 
headed exclusively to China had been completed (the rest 
of the pipeline to the Pacific Ocean was still under con-
struction), Beijing secured an additional discount for oil by 
threatening to drop the project altogether, which would 
have left Rosneft and Transneft with an almost completed 
pipeline and a huge debt. 
A similar situation occurred amid the negotiations over 
the	Power	of	Siberia	pipeline.	After	the	first	sanctions	hit,	
a 400 billion USD agreement in 2014 to supply China with 
38 billion cubic meters of gas per year was a much-need-
ed geopolitical victory for Russia. Yet, behind the impres-
sive numbers was a much more complicated reality. The gas 
price set in the agreement was not disclosed by Gazprom, 
which treated it as a commercial secret. Independent expert 
calculations based on the initial information on the agree-
ment suggest that the base price in the agreement in 2014 
was 350–360 USD per thousand cubic meters.23 However, 
the most recent data from Chinese customs shows that Chi-
na is currently paying about 200 USD per thousand cubic 
meters. Considering the fact that Beijing had denied Mos-
cow’s	request	for	financing	for	the	construction	of	the	pipe-
line, such figures suggest that the project can hardly be 
profitable	for	Gazprom	in	the	long	term.24 
MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
COOPERATION
Technology and military cooperation are probably the most 
far-reaching and promising part of Sino-Russian ties. Rus-
sia still has a competitive edge over China in military tech-
nologies, while the latter is ahead in telecommunication and 
AI industries. Amid the ongoing confrontation that both are 
experiencing with the West, their shared positions on ma-
ny issues such as human rights, internet sovereignty, or the 
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outcomes of the Second World War25 often underpin the 
development of their relationship in the military and tech-
nology realms. 
In the early and mid-2000s, Russia was highly suspicious 
of China’s pattern of reverse engineering military technol-
ogy and grew reluctant to sell it the most advanced arms. 
Yet, after a reassessment of the “China threat” in 2014, Mos-
cow decided to exploit its advantage in a narrowing win-
dow of opportunity, given that China’s military technology 
is likely to surpass that of Russia soon enough.26 In 2014–
2015, Russia sold China its most advanced anti-aircraft mis-
sile	system,	the	S-400,	and	its	latest	fighter	jet,	the	Su-35.	
The latest sign of growing trust in their military coopera-
tion was the 2019 announcement27 by President Vladimir 
Putin that Russia would assist China in developing its ballis-
tic missile early-warning system. The two countries have al-
so conducted a series of joint military drills.
In the meantime, China supplies Russia with high-level sur-
veillance equipment. For instance, in 2018, Rostelecom placed 
a 7.9 million USD order for Chinese-produced face-recogni-
tion cameras for Moscow’s municipal authorities. Mostly, the 
preference for Chinese equipment is based on strictly prac-
tical logic: Chinese producers provide the best price-quality 
ratio. Unlike many Western countries, Russia welcomes Hua-
wei in the development of its 5G networks. In 2019, several 
leading telecom providers in Russia started testing pilot 5G 
zones in collaboration with the Chinese giant. While Western 
states are basing their decisions to ban Huawei on security 
concerns, Moscow’s logic is that, at this moment, it is better 
to be spied on by China than by the West. 
LIMITS TO ANY GEOPOLITICAL 
RAPPROCHEMENT
In the geopolitical realm, there are clear limits to the rap-
prochement between China and Russia, which is unlikely to 
turn into a formal alliance in the near future. They share an 
outlook on many international issues, but they are careful 
not to become entangled in each other’s complicated posi-
tions on the global stage. 
25  Mark Magnier, “China and Russia send pointed message to Washington on war anniversary,” South China Morning Post, September 4, 2020:  
<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3100197/china-and-russia-send-pointed-message-washington-war> (accessed December 2, 2020).
26  Alexander Gabuev, Vita Spivak, “The Asymmetrical Russia-China Axis,” in Russia and China: Anatomy of Partnership, eds. Aldo Ferrari, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti (Milan, 
2019), pp. 37–60: <https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/report_russia-china-anatomy-of-a-partnership_0.pdf> (accessed December 2, 2020).
27  Dmitri Trenin, “How Cozy Is Russia and China’s Military Relationship?”, Carnegie Moscow Center, November 19, 2019:  
<https://carnegie.ru/2019/11/19/how-cozy-is-russia-and-china-s-military-relationship-pub-80363> (accessed December 2, 2020).
28  Yaroslav Trofimov, “The New Beijing-Moscow Axis,” The Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2019:  
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-beijing-moscow-axis-11549036661> (accessed December 2, 2020).
29  Anton Tsvetov, “Did Russia Just Side With China on the South China Sea?”, The Diplomat, April 21, 2016:  
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/did-russia-just-side-with-china-on-the-south-china-sea/> (accessed December 2, 2020).
On paper, geopolitical cooperation between China and Rus-
sia	has	been	flourishing	since	2014.	This	new	stage	in	their	
relationship is noticeable in various spheres. However, the 
West often misperceives this as alliance building. Russian 
and	Chinese	officials	are	very	careful	about	their	rhetoric	
when it comes to the question of a potential alliance and 
avoid bold statements. 
Despite intensified military ties and overall deepening of 
their cooperation, China and Russia are clearly unwilling to 
stand	in	the	middle	of	their	respective	crossfires	with	the	
West.28 For example, Beijing neither formally endorsed Mos-
cow’s annexation of Crimea nor openly criticized it, ex-
trapolating the consequences of such support to its own 
“problematic” non-Chinese-majority regions of Xinjiang and 
Tibet. For its part, Moscow never openly supported Beijing’s 
claims in the South China Sea in order to balance its rela-
tionship with Vietnam, one of the biggest buyers of Russian 
arms and one of the main opponents of China’s actions in 
the region.29 
Furthermore, despite their mutual assurances of friendship, 
in certain instances a lack of trust is still noticeable between 
China and Russia, which undermines their prospects of es-
tablishing	a	full-fledged	alliance.	The	COVID-19	pandem-
ic has been a major test of the depth of the Sino-Russian 
alignment. Many senior Russian officials were very angry 
about Beijing not being fully transparent about the spread 
of the virus and not sharing samples of it with Russian sci-
entists (the strain of the virus was later received from the 
United States instead). In the meantime, China was frustrat-
ed with the spreading Sinophobia in many Russian cities at 
the beginning of the pandemic. The way the Russian police 
treated Chinese nationals in Moscow led to a rare vocal and 
angry reaction from the Chinese embassy.
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By Niklas Swanström, Director of the Stockholm-based 
Institute for Security and Development Policy
China and Russia have consistently been building strate-
gic cooperation between one another. Even as Russia has 
sometimes used the word “alliance” to describe their rela-
tions, China has methodologically refrained from using it. In 
real terms, the relationship is still far from being an alliance. 
However,	for	the	first	time,30 the term is not so misplaced. If 
not an alliance, however, can bilateral relations between the 
two countries be labelled as a “marriage of convenience”? 
Indeed, the initial reasons for closer ties were more a result 
of	isolation	and	conflict	with	the	West	than	anything	sub-
stantial, but the relationship has developed into something 
much more concrete and concerning today. 
The Chinese side, which will be the focus of this brief chap-
ter, aims to rebalance global norms and values oriented to-
ward authoritarianism and centered on China. Both China and 
Russia have repeatedly and eagerly commented on their im-
proved	relations,	and,	if	this	rhetoric	is	reflective	of	reality,	the	
links are supposedly steadily improving. However, aside from 
their common disposition for authoritarian rule and mutual 
skepticism toward democratic nations, the two states have a 
very different orientation to the outside world and each have 
their own separate challenges and hurdles to overcome.
Russia is China’s only major ally in the new “Cold War.” With 
increased tensions with other major powers such as the 
30  This chapter was finished in September 2020. It thus reflects the situation of Russia-China relations at that time.
31  “International court strikes down China’s territorial claim,” CNBC, July 12, 2016:  
<https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/tensions-in-south-china-sea-to-persist-even-after-court-ruling.html> (accessed December 3, 2020).
32  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Moscow Meeting Between Heads of State of China and Russia,” June 18, 2009:  
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t573751.shtml> (accessed December 3, 2020).
33  Jonathan Hillman, “China and Russia: Economic Unequals,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 15, 2020:  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-russia-economic-unequals> (accessed December 7, 2020).
United States, the European Union, India, and others, Rus-
sia	fills	a	void.	Diplomatically,	China	is	willing	to	support	the	
actions of Russia, even if this is not universal or uncondi-
tional, and vice versa. China expects support in its domestic 
policies (such as the crackdown in Hong Kong, the incarcer-
ation camps in Xinjiang, etc.) as well as its foreign policy ac-
tivities. For example, Russia lent its voice to China in 2016 
when the Hague Tribunal ruled against China in the South 
China Sea31 and has been sympathetic toward China’s han-
dling of the democracy movement in Hong Kong and the 
Muslim community in Xinjiang. These examples aside, it 
would be a mistake to think that Russia and China would al-
ways support each other. Russian cooperation with Vietnam 
regarding oil drilling operations in the South China Sea, and 
the lack of outright support from China regarding Russia’s 
conflicts in Eastern Europe are just two examples where 
their so-called alliance has not looked so steadfast. 
COOPERATION AND CHALLENGES IN 
TRADE AND RESEARCH 
On the surface, arguably the most important cooperation 
for China with Russia is their strategic collaboration in 
technology and innovation. Recently, however, the inter-
est of China for cooperation in this sector has decreased, 
most probably due to Beijing’s own impressive technolog-
ical development. Moreover, Russia has become critical of 
China’s technological development, considering the tension 
between China and the United States, and growing isolation 
with the West and other democracies, such as Japan, Tai-
wan, India, and others.
There has been a growth of joint-research and innovation 
parks between China and Russia that has been very impres-
sive, both in terms of numbers as well as potential research, 
with what appears to be substantial funding to back it up. 
Joint funds have sprung up in several areas, for example, the 
Sino-Russian Joint Innovation Investment Fund has a capital 
of more than one billion USD. In 2009, then Chinese Pres-
ident Hu Jintao and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
announced that, by 2014,32 200 joint projects were to be 
initiated. To date, however, less than 10 percent of those 
projects had been implemented.33 The main challenge for 
increased cooperation is that China does not have the same 
need for Russian technology and innovation that Russia has. 
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Between 2014 and 2018, Russia established 20 Special Eco-
nomic Zones in the Russian Far East, but only six attracted 
Chinese investments34 and a limited value of 38 million USD. 
Russia needs the Chinese investments in research and de-
velopment, but the investments are not coming to the ex-
tent that Russia had hoped for. Similarly, there is a great 
deal of verbal agreement about increased cooperation in the 
Arctic, but the only completed joint project is the Yamal LPG 
base. In this case, however, Moscow seems to be the stum-
bling block, not Beijing. 
Sino-Russian trade is often presented in terms of the per-
centage	increase,	as	the	real	figures	are	typically	less	im-
pressive. Russia only accounts for 0.8 percent of the China 
trade. Even if Russia has a much larger dependency on Chi-
na – 15.5 percent of its trade – the trade with the EU is 
twice the size of its trade with China.35 However, the year-
ly increase in trade is impressive, even if it is not always in 
key industries. Natural resources and energy resources ac-
count for 70 percent of the total trade, and agriculture has 
been the fastest growing trade sector in the bilateral trade 
relations. For example, Russian exports of poultry increased 
58.8 percent in January to June 2020, compared with the 
same period in 2019, according to the Russian Ministry of 
Agriculture.36 Chinese trade with Russia is too often por-
trayed in the media as critical to its economy, and without 
it, Russia would be in the hands of the West. Still, the reality 
is that Russia is more dependent on Europe than on China. 
Similarly, China’s dependence on Russia is limited, and its 
trade dependency on the EU and the United States is much 
more crucial for its import and export levels.
A large and steady supply of natural resources – in partic-
ular, oil and food – are crucial for China. However, it is not 
too	difficult	for	China	to	find	alternatives	to	Russian	prod-
ucts, even if it possibly comes at a higher and more unpre-
dictable price on the open market, where it makes much of 
its purchases. Still, as long as the trade remains relative-
ly modest, it creates further Russian dependence on Chi-
na but not Chinese dependence on Russia. When it comes 
to oil, the Middle East is far more important to China than 
Russia currently is. The proposed cooperation between the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Eurasian Economic Union 
34  Vita Spivak, “Why Russia’s Special Economic Zones Fail to Attract Chinese Investors,” Italian Institute for Political Studies, November 4, 2019:  
<https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/why-russias-special-economic-zones-fail-attract-chinese-investors-24316> (accessed December 3, 2020).
35  Jonathan Hillman, “China and Russia: Economic Unequals” (see note 33). 
36  Natalie Berkhout, “Russian chicken exports to China surge,” Poultry World, November 17, 2020:  
<https://www.poultryworld.net/Meat/Articles/2020/11/Russian-chicken-exports-to-China-surges-671463E/> (accessed December 7, 2020). 
37  President of Russia, “Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. Vladimir Putin attended the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation,” April 26, 
2019: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60378> (accessed December 3, 2020).
38  Nadezhda Tsydenova, Anna Rzhevkina, “Huawei in talks to install Russian operating system on tablets for country’s population census,” Reuters, August 26, 2019: 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-russia-partnership/huawei-in-talks-to-install-russian-operating-system-on-tablets-for-countrys-population-census-sources-
idUSKCN1VG1VN> (accessed December 3, 2020).
(EEU) is another case in point in this unequal relationship. 
There, the EEU has just a portion of the BRI’s economic 
strength and growth potential. Russian President Vladimir 
Putin has pushed somewhat hard for cooperation on what 
he described in Beijing in April 2019 as equal cooperation.37 
Still, the reality is that the BRI and EEU are two very differ-
ent initiatives. Through the EEU, Moscow seeks more direct 
control of the economies and states. The BRI, on the other 
hand, seeks stable markets and transit routes as well as, of 
course, political control, through which it gets support and 
a large degree of self-censorship in each state – although 
this is a secondary target. Despite the unequal departure 
point, Russia needs the benefits stemming from the EEU, 
even though this could, within the medium- to- long term, 
result	in	decreased	Russian	influence	in	its	backyard	and	in-
creased Chinese control over the region. 
IDEOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
SECURITY RELATIONS
The ideological, anti-Western front that is a bulwark against 
democracy, individual human rights (as a contrast to the hu-
man rights of the state and collective), and the free econ-
omy is an essential component for China in its relations 
with Russia – even if it would not necessarily be defined 
that way by the parties. More important is the coopera-
tion around the digital economy, 5G telecommunications 
technology,	artificial	intelligence,	biotechnology,	and	mili-
tary cooperation with its applications both domestically and 
internationally. Much of the new technology is led by Chi-
nese innovation, but there are important exceptions, such 
as robotics and missile technology. Consequently, there are 
still	significant	incentives	for	China	to	collaborate	with	Rus-
sia. For example, if Huawei could adopt the Russian Avro-
ra operating system instead of the Android system on its 
phones,38 this would keep Russia in the game and be a clear 
snub to the West. 
In the area of robotics and military development, especial-
ly missile defense systems, Russian technology still has sig-
nificant	advantages.	That	said,	Russian	technology	is	rapidly	
decreasing in importance due to the lack of resources in re-
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search and development, and it is merely a matter of time 
before the Chinese need for Russian technology is minimal. 
For example, the much-hyped export of Russian weapons 
to China amounted to approximately 76 percent of Chinese 
arms imports between 2015 and 2018.39 Still, China has now 
surpassed Russia as the world’s second-largest arms ex-
porter, and China has developed (or perhaps stolen) tech-
nology that could rival Russia’s in many areas, even if not 
all.	Several	senior	military	officials	in	China	have,	in	private	
conversations with the author, snubbed much, if not all, of 
arms imports as “aid” to Russia and argued that they should 
stop buying sub-standard equipment from Russia. China is 
increasingly only interested in top-shelf technology from 
Russia, such as missile technology, jet engines, radar sys-
tems, etc. The Russian need to tie China closer to its arms 
production could also be a reason why Moscow reduced the 
restrictions for Chinese arms sales and increased the coop-
eration in research as well as the joint production of the lat-
est military technology. 
From the Chinese perspective, a more valuable exchange 
is to learn from the Russian experience when it comes to 
combat, surveillance, censorship, and disinformation. Rus-
sia has a great deal more experience in these areas inter-
nationally than China does. China has not been engaged in 
experiences of modern warfare, which weakens its ability 
to act internationally. Hence, China’s interest in the Russian 
experience is substantial. When looking more closely at the 
techniques	of	Chinese	influence	campaigns	against	foreign	
media, academics, and decision-makers, it is apparent that 
China has adopted some of the Russian operative behavior 
with Chinese technology. Following disinformation cam-
paigns and cyber operations in both Europe and Asia,40 it 
is evident that there seems to be a lot of information shar-
ing between Russia and China in this regard – even if there 
is not yet substantial evidence to claim that there is formal 
cooperation	in	specific	operations.	However,	it	seems	un-
likely that China and Russia would be interested in coordi-
nating any offensive cyber operations at this time. China’s 
more brutish behavior directly corresponds to the Russian 
operations and tactics, something that has also been crit-
icized in the Chinese military and intelligence community 
for being counterproductive. In 2015, Russia and China be-
gan cooperation on “communications and information tech-
nology.”41 In June 2019, the “Joint Declaration of the Russian 
39  “Russia’s share of total imports of major arms from 2015 to 2019, by country,” Statista, March 10, 2020:  
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1102702/countries-where-russia-is-a-major-arms-supplier/> (accessed December 3, 2020).
40  The case of Taiwan was the main focal point for ISDP’s research on this issue.
41  Ministerstvo tsifrovovo razvitiya, svyazi i massovykh kommunikatsii Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media of the Russian 
Federations], “Rossiya i Kitay obsudili voprosi sotrudnichestva v sfere svyazi i IKT” [Russia and China discussed collaboration in spheres of communications and ICT], September 
18, 2015: <https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/33990/> (accessed December 3, 2020).
42  Yaroslav Trofimov, “The New Beijing-Moscow Axis,” The Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2019:  
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-beijing-moscow-axis-11549036661> (accessed December 3, 2020).
Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the De-
velopment of a Comprehensive, Strategic Partnership En-
tering a New Era” emerged as a much more sophisticated 
and far-reaching collaboration. China and Russia have now 
agreed to: 
“Strengthen exchanges in the field of legal regulation of activ-
ities in the information space, to jointly promote the principle 
of management of the information-telecommunications net-
work, the ‘Internet.’”
This	was	the	first	time	the	two	countries	agreed	to	work	in	
collaboration internationally on surveillance, blocking un-
wanted sources of information, and activating cyber warfare 
strategies. However, it is unclear in the agreement – and 
operationally – how much the partnership has led to joint 
operations, formal exchanges of information, etc., and how 




The most provocative and consistent long-term use China 
has of Russia is leverage, support, and strategic depth when 
it takes its “rightful” place in the world. Gu Xuetang, the di-
rector of the Institute of International Strategy and Policy 
Analysis (IISPA) in Shanghai, framed this aptly when he said:
 
“China does not want a two-front war, and neither does Rus-
sia, so China defends the East and Russia defends the West.”42
This is not a formal alliance, but it creates a situation in 
which China can act aggressively without concern for a 
two-front war on its western border. Arguably, it would not 
have been possible for China to act so aggressively in the 
South China Sea and against the United States without tac-
it support from Russia, which provides strategic depth, dip-
lomatic support, military technology, and, in the case of a 
military	conflict,	an	extensive	resource	base.	There	are	no	
expectations from Beijing that Russia will fight alongside 
China, but the already strong support would enable them to 
act more independently and assertively. 
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That said, coordinated military action is no longer unimag-
inable, although still unlikely – even in the event of an attack 
on China or Russia’s territory. Sino-Russian exercises have 
grown in number, size, and importance, and they involve all 
types of military operations. It is worth noting that, in the 
“Kavkaz-2020” exercise in September 2020, China partici-
pated, but not India, which opted out due to Chinese aggres-
sion in the Himalayas. Strategic cooperation between China 
and Russia is deemed to increase in importance as they are 
increasingly relying on each other and there are major ben-
efits	in	terms	of	the	exchange	of	information,	joint	exercis-
es, and, not least, the optics toward possible partners. This is 
despite some serious concerns in China about calling Russia 
an allied power. In at least one private conversation, a Chi-
nese General of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) point-
edly asked where the West would put its resources if there 
was	to	be	a	conflict	situation	with	Taiwan,	and	Russia	would	
create a diffusion in Europe? The logic of such thinking is 
not	entirely	flawed,	even	if	highly	damaging	for	both	Russia	
and	China.	China’s	lack	of	live	battlefield	experience	makes	it	
necessary to test how the military reforms have impacted its 
fighting	ability	–	and	this	in	the	relatively	short	term.	This	is	
something that Chinese military leaders have stressed time 
and time again, even if among internal military circles there 
are growing concerns that this is a dangerous path for Chi-
na	to	take.	The	Syrian	conflict	and	the	Russian	experience	
gained there has been invaluable for China. Should a limited 
conflict	occur	over	the	islands	controlled	by	Taiwan	or	over	
the South China Sea, however, it would be even more use-
ful for China if Beijing could expect Russia’s diplomatic and 
ideological support while also avoiding a full-scale escalation 
with the United States. 
ALLIANCE IN THE MAKING? 
A formal alliance is not likely, even if possible. But, more im-
portantly, it does not matter as the current structure gives 
both China and Russia what they need at the moment. Con-
sidering the 2001 China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighbor-
liness and Friendly Cooperation43 and Article 5 of NATO’s 
founding treaty, the expectations are not too far from each 
other. Article 5 allows some leeway in volunteering support, 
43  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation,” July 24, 2001: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15771.shtml> (accessed December 3, 2020).
44  Ibid.
45  “Gui Minhai: China sentences Swedish bookseller to 10 years in jail,” The Local, February 25, 2020:  
<https://www.thelocal.se/20200225/gui-minhai-china-sentences-swedish-bookseller-to-10-years-in-jail> (accessed December 2, 2020). 
46  “How Sweden copes with Chinese bullying,” The Economist, February 20, 2020:  
<https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/02/20/how-sweden-copes-with-chinese-bullying> (accessed December 7, 2020).
47  Eduardo Baptista, “Why Russia’s Vladivostok celebration prompted a nationalist backlash in China,” South China Morning Post, July 2, 2020:  
<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3091611/why-russias-vladivostok-celebration-prompted-nationalist> (accessed December 2, 2020). Formally, the 
Chinese government has accepted the current borders and has argued that China has no claims on the Russian Far East. If this changes, it would indicate a much more radical 
and expansionist policy in China that would fundamentally transform Sino-Russian relations. 
and, given the political leadership in some NATO members, 
the	expectations	of	solidarity	in	a	conflict	situation	are	not	
that strong. Article 9 of the 2001 treaty between Russia and 
China states that: 
“When a situation arises in which one of the contracting par-
ties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined 
or its security interests are involved or when it is confront-
ed with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall 
immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to elim-
inate such threats.”44
This formulation does not guarantee that the states would 
fight	side	by	side,	but	it	gives	a	similar	intention,	albeit	not	
as strong of a commitment as contained in Article 5 of the 
NATO treaty. Here, it is essential to understand that the 
main reluctance to further strengthen the alliance comes 
from China. Beijing has refrained from creating anything 
that would resemble alliances. Still, with a much more as-
sertive and aggressive foreign policy under President Xi 
Jinping, it has become possible with closer military cooper-
ation, and, most importantly, a tacit agreement on how both 
sides engage with each other and the outside world. 
The question is: how far will collaboration with Russia take 
China?	Beijing’s	eyes	are	more	firmly	focused	on	Europe	and	
the United States as its future lies in these economies. Sev-
eral	senior	officials	in	China	have,	over	the	years,	mentioned	
that the support for democracy runs thin in many Europe-
an states, not least in Eastern Europe, but also in Italy and 
Germany – countries that have been referred to as having 
totalitarian tendencies. This misperception was one reason 
why the Chinese were surprised about the European reac-
tion to the crackdown in Hong Kong or about the Swedish 
response to the arrest of publisher and writer Gui Minghai.45 
As if to illustrate that interpretation and frustration from 
China during that time, the Chinese Ambassador to Sweden 
mentioned	that	“We	treat	our	friends	with	fine	wine,	but	for	
our enemies we have shotguns.”46
Finally, it is worth being reminded of Zhang Heqing from 
the Chinese Foreign Ministry who, about Vladivostok, said: 
“Isn’t this what in the past was our Haishenwai?”47 This view 
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has not often been heard from officials since Mao, but it 
is	in	line	with	the	influential	netizens	that	are	increasing-
ly allowed to have a more radical and nationalistic message. 
Border delimitation should be done with the Chinese inter-
est in mind and, while Russia is useful today, they might not 
be so tomorrow. 
All in all, relations between Russia and China are a mar-
riage of convenience as both eye other potential part-
ners, but the marriage is stronger than it has been before. 
Hence, it would be dangerous to dismiss this marriage as 
simply something that will pass. Moscow and Beijing share 
strong	normative	values	and,	if	they	could	manage	the	diffi-
cult economic dimensions of their relationship, it could be 
something that could last.
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Joe Biden and 
Russia: The 
Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly
By Andrey Kortunov, Director General of the Russian  
International Affairs Council
Someone wittily noted that Richard Wagner’s music is not 
as bad as it sounds. Likewise, the foreign policy of US Pres-
ident Joseph R. Biden toward Russia may not be as harsh 
as his election campaign statements suggest.48 Of course, 
the devil, as always, is in the details. The Democratic ad-
ministration	has	not	inherited	one	single	Russia	file	from	
its predecessors; instead, it received a mixture of assorted 
files.	On	some	of	these	issues,	Joe	Biden	might	turn	out	to	
be better than Donald Trump, while, on others, he could be 
much worse. And in some cases, it could get very ugly.
FOREIGN POLICY NOT A TOP PRIORITY
First, it is easy to predict that foreign policy will not be 
Biden’s	top	priority	for	at	least	the	first	half	year	of	his	ad-
ministration or even longer. There are too many domestic 
matters that his new team will have to put ahead of foreign 
policy. These matters include handling the COVID-19 pan-
demic and its repercussions,49 securing economic recov-
ery, and mitigating deep social and political divisions in the 
country. It is still not clear how Biden will manage his rela-
tions	with	Congress,	which	is	in	a	position	to	significantly	
delay some of his key nominations, including those directly 
related to foreign policy.
When	the	Democratic	president	finally	gets	down	to	his	for-
eign policy agenda, it is not likely that the Russia portfolio 
48  This chapter was finished in early December 2020. It thus reflects the situation of US-Russia relations at that time. 
49  For detailed information on the COVID-19 situation in the United States, see the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “CDC COVID Data Tracker”:  
<https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days> (accessed December 13, 2020).
50  Ellen Nakashima, “Fewer opportunities and a changed political environment in the US may have curbed Moscow’s election interference this year, analysts say,” The 
Washington Post, November 17, 2020: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russia-failed-to-mount-major-election-interference-operations-in-2020-analysts-
say/2020/11/16/72c62b0c-1880-11eb-82db-60b15c874105_story.html> (accessed December 13, 2020).
51  Steven Pifer, “Reviving nuclear arms control under Biden,” Brookings Institution, December 1, 2020:  
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/01/reviving-nuclear-arms-control-under-biden/> (accessed December 13, 2020).
will be at the top of it. Joe Biden is more likely to focus on 
the transatlantic relations seriously damaged by his prede-
cessor. Another burning matter is a trade agreement with 
China; this will not end US-Chinese economic or techno-
logical competition, but it can at least help to prevent a ful-
ly-fledged trade war between Washington and Beijing. In 
short,	Biden	can	allow	himself	to	put	most	of	the	Russia	files	
on the back burner – with the possible exception of pending 
strategic arms control matters.
The good news for US-Russia relations is the fact that, so 
far,	no	significant	Russian	involvement	in	the	US	elections	
of 2020 has been detected.50 This does not necessarily mean 
that this matter will disappear completely from Biden’s ra-
dar, but it is not likely to affect the American domestic po-
litical agenda of 2021 as much as it did back in 2017.
ARMS CONTROL
On arms control, Biden’s administration is likely to be large-
ly better than Trump’s was. President-Elect Biden has never 
supported the irresponsible attitude of his predecessor to 
arms control in general or to bilateral US-Russian arms con-
trol in particular. He might well try to rescue the New Stra-
tegic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)51 and to abide 
informally by the provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nu-
clear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), from which the United 
States withdrew in summer 2019. He is likely to pay more 
attention to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucle-
ar Weapons (commonly known as NPT), the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and other multilateral nuclear arms 
agreements that Trump did not consider to be of top impor-
tance for the United States. However, this does not mean 
that bilateral US-Russian arms control has a bright future 
under Biden – any agreements beyond the New START will 
be	very	difficult	to	negotiate.	Many	fundamental	disagree-
ments between the two sides on such issues as tactical nu-
clear weapons, ballistic missile defense, engaging China and 
other nuclear powers, etc., will not disappear under the new 
administration. It is also clear that the Biden administration 
will have to start reviewing and revising the old paradigm of 
strategic arms control in order to catch up with the latest 
technological developments (space, cyber, autonomous le-
thal systems, etc.).
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THE MIDDLE EAST AND RUSSIA’S 
NEIGHBORHOOD
Another change in US foreign policy under President Biden 
from	which	Russia	could	benefit	is	a	potential	softening	of	
the US position on Iran52 and a more balanced US approach 
to the Middle East peace process. The Kremlin would un-
doubtedly welcome the return of the United States to the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or an increased 
emphasis on multilateral approaches to an Israeli-Palestin-
ian settlement. In addition, Biden may decide to stop the 
ongoing “diplomatic war” with Russia; he arguably values 
professional diplomacy much more than his predecessor 
Donald Trump did, and he is not likely to keep the Russian 
Embassy in Washington (and the US Embassy in Moscow) 
in a state of siege. In general, Biden will delegate more au-
thority and more power to foreign policy experts and pro-
fessionals (“Deep State”), including those among them who 
will be responsible for the Russia portfolio. Therefore, US 
policy toward Russia is likely to be more consistent, realis-
tic, and predictable.
The “bad side” of Biden for Russia will start manifesting it-
self in much harder and uncompromising rhetoric target-
ing the Russian leadership. Joe Biden, unlike Donald Trump, 
is not a fan of Vladimir Putin, and he will not be shy in ex-
pressing his uncomplimentary views of the Russian presi-
dent. Moreover, Biden will pay more attention to human 
rights problems in Russia; he also will extend more support 
to the political opposition in Russia and to politicized civil 
society institutions.53 In addition, he will demonstrate more 
sympathy to democratic states in Russia’s neighborhood – 
from Ukraine to Georgia (perhaps also including more ac-
tive support for the democratic opposition in Belarus). US 
support of Kyiv is likely to grow, including various forms of 
military assistance.
STRONGER TRANSATLANTIC TIES
A likely change in transatlantic relations will also have an 
impact on Russia’s foreign policy. The numerous political, 
economic, and strategic differences between Washington 
and Brussels will not just disappear, of course, and there will 
certainly be no return to the good old days of Barack Obama 
and Bill Clinton.54 Still, Biden, with his foreign policy experi-
52  Gordon Lubold, Joshua Jamerson, “Biden National Security Adviser Sees US Rejoining Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2020:  
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-national-security-adviser-sees-u-s-rejoining-iran-nuclear-deal-11607399179> (accessed December 13, 2020).
53  Dmitri Trenin, “Joe Biden’s Foreign Policy and Russia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, November 19, 2020: <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/83270> (accessed December 13, 2020).
54  Michael Klimmage, Pavel Koshkin, Victoria Zhuravleva, Peter B. Zwack, “US-Russia Relations under the Biden Administration: an Expert Analysis,” Wilson Center, December 
11, 2020: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-russia-relations-under-biden-administration-expert-analysis> (accessed December 13, 2020).
55  Dimitri Simes Jr., “For Russia, Biden’s rise strengthens China’s gravitational pull,” Nikkei Asia, November 17, 2020:  
<https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/US-elections-2020/For-Russia-Biden-s-rise-strengthens-China-s-gravitational-pull> (accessed December 13, 2020).
ence and inclination to compromise, will work diligently to 
restore transatlantic relations. Under Biden, we will likely 
see	more	flexibility	from	Washington	on	trade	talks	with	the	
EU, more readiness to consider the EU’s opinion in US ap-
proaches to global problems, and increased attention to Eu-
ropean positions on regional crises.
Even a partial restoration of transatlantic unity will be a blow 
to the image of the world that the Russian leadership likes to 
paint. A new consolidation of the West, no matter how tem-
porary,	is	at	odds	with	the	official	Kremlin	narrative	about	the	
inexorable movement of the international system toward a 
polycentric world order. Worse still, it might give the collec-
tive	West	new	confidence.	In	addition,	a	new	reconciliation	
between the EU and the United States will be a major blow to 
the various Euroskeptics, populists, and nationalists for whom 
Trump is a role model, and will tip the scales within the EU 
against them. It will also hurt some of the Kremlin’s political 
partners in Europe. A Biden victory will inject new life into 
proponents of the Western liberal values that Vladimir Putin 
has already written off as hopelessly obsolete.
A change of administration in the White House will likely re-
duce, though not eliminate, the EU’s interest in normalizing 
relations with Russia. Having agreed a truce on the western 
front, Brussels will be more than capable of swiftly trans-
ferring its forces to the eastern front, taking a harder line 
toward the Kremlin. A Democratic US president will like-
ly applaud such a strategic move, seeing the standoff with 
Russia as a way of cementing the transatlantic partner-
ship. In all likelihood, a Biden victory will severely limit Rus-
sia’s room for maneuver in its EU policy, and perhaps in its 
broader foreign policy too. A more united West might con-
solidate itself not only on an anti-Russia platform, but also, 
to a lesser degree, against China.
CONTINUED STANDOFF WITH CHINA
Amid the standoff with Beijing, a Biden administration will 
probably seek to expand its alliances and establish new 
partnerships in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. 
Though such a policy will target China, it will also indirect-
ly affect Russia, as it will likely accelerate the move toward 
a bipolar international system, increasing Moscow’s depen-
dence on Beijing – with all the ensuing consequences.55
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For a couple of years, we have observed the US policy of “dual 
containment” with Washington applying more and more pres-
sure on both Beijing and Moscow. This pressure has become 
an important factor cementing the Chinese-Russian strate-
gic partnership; today, even a formal military-political alliance 
between the two countries is no longer a purely theoretical 
construct, but a plausible geopolitical option. 
This situation is a clear strategic setback for Washington. 
Since at least the early twentieth century, one of the most 
important goals of US foreign policy has always been to pre-
vent any consolidated anti-American center of power in 
Eurasia. US policymakers have perceived a divided Eurasian 
landmass as an indispensable prerequisite for the global US 
strategic hegemony. Former US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger understood the critical importance of keeping 
Eurasia	divided	better	than	anyone;	he	was	more	efficient	
than any US leader before him in exploiting the growing 
rifts between Beijing and Moscow back in the early 1970s.
A US-CHINA-RUSSIA TRIANGLE
Can President-Elect Joe Biden repeat Henry Kissinger’s suc-
cess and resurrect the US-China-Russia triangle with the 
United	States	at	the	top	of	it?	Of	course,	almost	fifty	years	
have passed since Kissinger’s famous trip to Beijing in Ju-
ly	of	1971.	The	world	today	is	definitely	very	different	from	
the world of the twentieth century; the old theology of geo-
politics may look old-fashioned and even antiquated. Still, 
let us consider the options that the leadership of the United 
States has in trying to keep Eurasia divided. 
The	first	option	would	be	to	read	Henry	Kissinger	literal-
ly, that is, to support the weaker US adversary against the 
stronger one. Today, it would mean that Washington should 
try to bring Moscow to the American side in its predestined 
confrontation with Beijing.56 After all, Russia is no longer a 
Communist country, and Russian leaders should be con-
cerned about the growing asymmetry of power between 
their country and China. To play the weaker adversary 
against the stronger one was a stated goal of the Trump ad-
ministration that it failed to achieve. US-Russian relations 
did not get any better under Trump; on the contrary, they 
sank to historic lows.
It is highly unlikely that Joe Biden can be more successful 
in pursuing this goal than his predecessor was. The Unit-
ed States simply has nothing to offer to President Putin 
56  In accord with what Anthony Blinken, Biden’s nominee for the position of US Secretary of State, has recently suggested, see: Lara Jakes, Michael Crowley, David E. Sanger, 
“Biden Chooses Anthony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as Secretary of State,” New York Times, November 22, 2020:  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/biden-antony-blinken-secretary-of-state.html> (accessed December 13, 2020).
to make him reconsider his current close friendship with 
Chairman Xi Jinping – be it in economic, political, or stra-
tegic domains. Even if Biden were considering a new ap-
proach to the Kremlin, he would hardly be in a position to 
go for such a reset: the anti-Russian consensus in Washing-
ton is too strong and shows no signs of crumbling. It seems 
that the US-Russian relationship is locked in confrontation-
al mode for many years to come. 
The second option for Biden in trying to resurrect the 
US-China-Russia triangle would be to play on the oppo-
site side of the stage, seeking an acceptable accommodation 
with the stronger Beijing and putting the squeeze on the 
weaker Moscow. Turning Kissinger’s geopolitical scheme 
on	its	head	is	certain	to	find	a	host	of	supporters	and	ad-
vocates in Washington. For them, Russia makes a far more 
convenient opponent than China. The United States would 
have	to	pay	an	exorbitant	price	for	a	full-fledged	confronta-
tion with China: a drop in its vital bilateral trade, severance 
of established global technological chains, a rapid increase 
in military spending, etc. The US-Russia confrontation will 
cost much less given that there is very little economic and 
technological mutual dependence between the two states. 
Also, Moscow is far less prepared to engage in costly mili-
tary competition with America.
However, is it realistic for Biden to count on a sweet deal 
with China? Such a deal requires the White House to be 
willing to reconsider its fundamental ideas about the place 
that the United States holds in the system of internation-
al relations. The US will have to abandon its claim to glob-
al American hegemony similar to that of the times of Henry 
Kissinger. Certainly, neither Biden nor his entourage are 
ready to do that. If a revolution in America’s self-perception 
and its perception of the world ever starts, this is not like-
ly to happen earlier than 2024 and, until that time, Washing-
ton-Beijing relations will remain complicated and tense.
 
Even more importantly – just as Donald Trump repeatedly 
saw that it was impossible to tear Russia away from China 
throughout the four years of his presidency – Joe Biden will 
repeatedly see that China cannot be torn away from Russia. 
Beijing needs Moscow regardless of the current state of Chi-
na-US relations and their prospects for the future. China’s 
leadership will be happy to act as an arbiter or “balancer” 
between Russia and the United States, but it will not active-
ly support the US desire to corner Russia. In other words, if 
a US-China-Russia triangle could ever emerge, it would be a 
triangle with Beijing, not Washington, on the top of it.
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Thus, if the Biden administration attempts to resurrect the 
US-China-Russia triangle, it will not accomplish a lot. Under 
the current circumstances, a version of “dual containment” 
appears to be its most likely approach toward Beijing and 
Moscow, with China being treated more as a peer compet-
itor and Russia as a global rogue state. To cut the costs of 
dual containment, the Biden administration will try to mo-
bilize the Western allies of the United States in Europe and 
East Asia. It will also try to keep Eurasia divided by forging 
stronger ties to China’s adversaries in Asia – above all, to 
India. By doing so, Joe Biden will inevitably push the world 
closer to a new geopolitical bipolarity, rather than to a mod-
ernized version of the US-China-Russia triangle.
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in a Biden  
Administration
By Angela Stent, Professor and Director of the Center  
for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies of 
Georgetown University
There are two important facts to remember when ap-
proaching the question of how a Biden administration will 
deal with Russia.57 First, there is much more continuity in 
Russia policy between Republican and Democratic admin-
istrations than some would like to admit. Quite simply, the 
issues on the agenda with Russia do not change that much. 
Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin has de facto 
been in power for twenty years and may remain in the 
Kremlin for another sixteen. Dealing with Putin’s Russia en-
sures that there will be continuity. 
Second, even though every US administration since 1992 
has tried its own “reset” with Russia, all have ended in dis-
appointment.	Washington’s	and	Moscow’s	definition	of	what	
a productive relationship would look like are very differ-
ent and their expectations for a reset do not align. The one 
exception was during the presidential interlude of Dmitry 
Medvedev when US President Barack Obama and Medvedev 
did improve ties; but that ended when Putin returned to 
the Kremlin. Under the best of circumstances, the US-Rus-
sian relationship is a compartmented one, in which ar-
eas of cooperation coexist with areas of competition and 
disagreement.
57  This chapter was finished in early December 2020. It thus reflects the situation of US-Russia relations at that time.
58  Constanze Stelzenmüller, “America’s Dysfunctional Russia Policy is Unlikely to Improve Under Biden,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2020:  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/30/election-2020-u-s-russia-trump-biden/> (accessed December 18, 2020).
59  For details, see: Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, “Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Elections,” US Department of Justice, 
Washington DC, March 2019: <https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2020).
60  Alina Polyakova, Filippos Letsas, “On the record: the US administration’s actions on Russia,” Order from Chaos (blog), Brookings Institution, December 31, 2019:  
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/25/on-the-record-the-u-s-administrations-actions-on-russia/> (accessed December 18, 2020).
61  Dianne Francis, “US expands sanctions against Putin’s pipeline,” Ukraine Alert, October 22, 2020:  
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/us-expands-sanctions-against-putins-pipeline/> (accessed December 18, 2020).
62  Jack Detsch, “Trump Wants China on Board With New Arms Control Pact,” Foreign Policy, July 23, 2020:  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/23/trump-china-russia-new-arms-control-agreement-start/> (accessed December 18, 2020).
THE TRUMP LEGACY 
The legacy of the Trump administration’s policy toward 
Russia is unique inasmuch as there was a huge gulf between 
what Trump himself sought to accomplish with Russia and 
what the rest of the executive branch and the US Congress 
believed was appropriate.58 Russia policy was bifurcated and 
often inconsistent. This policy has left a legacy with which 
the Biden team will have to deal.
• Because of Russia’s 2016 interference in the US presi-
dential election59 and the Kremlin’s obvious support for 
Donald Trump, Russia has become a toxic domestic issue 
in a way not seen since the 1950s, an integral part of the 
polarization	of	American	society.	It	has	been	very	diffi-
cult to have a rational discussion about Russia.
• The Trump administration can claim few accomplish-
ments in its Russia policy, despite Trump’s own desire to 
make a “deal” with President Putin. The US State Depart-
ment jettisoned many of the normal diplomatic channels 
for interacting with Russia and high-level contacts were 
only sporadic.
• The main features of the administration’s policy were 
diplomatic expulsions and rafts of sanctions in response 
to election interference and the Skripal poisonings.60 
These include halting the construction of the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline by sanctioning European companies 
involved in the project.61 
• The Trump administration pulled out of the Intermedi-
ate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and belatedly began 
negotiations on extending the New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (New START) while initially insisting 
that Chinese weapons be included in any future treaty.62 
Its position shifted several times on these issues and 
Russia appears to have rejected the latest offer.
• It appears that Russia did not interfere in any concerted 
way in the 2020 election, raising the possibility that this 
issue could be viewed differently going forward.
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HOW MIGHT A BIDEN ADMINISTRATION 
DESIGN ITS POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA?
The Biden team has promised to restore diplomacy to what 
it used to be, end the politicization of the US Department 
of State, and bring back professional diplomats who were 
coerced into leaving. Part of this re-professionalization of 
the State Department would involve restoring channels of 
communication with Russia that have atrophied, including 
relaunching regular strategic stability talks. Biden has also 
pledged to reinvigorate relations with US allies in Europe 
and Asia and to recommit to NATO. In particular, there is a 
recognition that Washington and Berlin should work closely 
together as they approach ties with Russia. 
There may also be moves to detoxify the domestic aspect of 
ties to Russia, since election interference may begin to re-
cede as a toxic issue in US domestic politics. 
The top priority for the Biden administration will be ex-
tending New START. The agreement expires on February 5, 
2021, so there would be just over two weeks after his Jan-
uary 20 inauguration to accomplish this. If the treaty were 
to	be	extended	for	five	years	as	is,	then	the	Senate	will	not	
have to ratify it. The Russian Duma would have to, but one 
expects that, if the Kremlin wants this extension, it will hap-
pen.63 There will also be negotiations on a follow-on treaty 
that might include new classes of weapons and some more 
countries, but this would all happen later. The issue of inter-
mediate-range nuclear weapons could also be taken up again. 
In addition, the Biden team will re-examine the sanctions 
that the Trump administration imposed in Russia. Con-
gress took over sanctions policy from the White House and, 
now	that	they	are	enshrined	in	law,	they	are	difficult	to	re-
move. But there will be a reassessment of how effective they 
have been in achieving the goal of altering Russian policy in 
Ukraine or diminishing election interference. Biden does not 
oppose sanctions and his team supports the sanctions on 
Nord Stream 2, but there could be a shift in the emphasis of 
the sanctions policy – and more sanctions could be imposed. 
Since President Trump’s impeachment in December 2019, 
the administration has not been active on Ukraine-related 
issues. The Biden team has committed itself to re-engaging 
63  David M. Herszenhorn, “US and Russia poised to extend New START arms treaty,” Politico, October 21, 2020:  
<https://www.politico.eu/article/us-and-russia-poised-to-extend-new-start-treaty/> (accessed December 18, 2020).
64  Anders Åslund, “Why a Biden presidency is very good news for Ukraine,” Ukraine Alert, The Atlantic Council, November 8, 2020:  
<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-a-biden-presidency-is-very-good-news-for-ukraine/> (accessed December 18, 2020).
65  Russia Matters, “Joe Biden and Kamala Harris on Russia,” November 9, 2020:  
<https://russiamatters.org/analysis/joe-biden-and-kamala-harris-russia>(accessed December 18, 2020).
66  This piece was finalized before the hacking of several US government institutions that was first reported on December 13, 2020.
67  Russia Matters, “Biden and Harris on Russia” (see note 65).
actively with Ukraine.64 It is not yet known whether it will 
appoint a new Special Envoy for Ukraine, but this could also 
become part of its agenda with Moscow.
Biden may decide to re-join the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action agreement with Iran. If so, this could be an area 
where Moscow and Washington work together, as they did 
during the Obama administration.65
There are several other areas where the United States and 
Russia might work together. The first is climate change. 
Biden will recommit the United States to the Paris Accords. 
Putin, in his recent Valdai address, emphasized the dangers 
of climate change, something he has not done so explicitly 
before. If the Biden administration rejoins the World Health 
Organization and commits itself to international cooper-
ation on infectious diseases, particularly COVID-19, this is 
another	potential	field	for	bilateral	cooperation.	The	Arc-
tic is another area where the United States and Russia both 
cooperate and compete. There is military competition and 
competition for resources. But both countries sit on the 
Arctic Council and Barents Sea Council and work togeth-
er	there.	Arctic	issues	will	gain	in	significance	in	the	coming	
decade and demand more attention.
There	is	a	significant	question	mark	over	the	issue	of	cyber	
interference. Biden has promised to make Russia more ac-
countable for its hostile cyber acts, possibly with the im-
position of more sanctions. Russia is regarded, along with 
China, as a top cyber threat to the United States. The Rus-
sians have, on several occasions, offered to sit down with 
the United States and discuss a mutual cyber non-interfer-
ence pact. So far, such offers have not been taken seriously 
and have been dismissed, but this situation might change.66
Although a Biden administration will engage with Russia on 
some issues of mutual interest, there will also be push back 
on issues of democracy, human rights, and dark money.67 
The Biden team has committed itself to creating a global 
community of democracies and to imposing costs on coun-
tries that violate human rights. It has also indicated that 
there will be more scrutiny governing the ability of wealthy 
Russians to invest their money in the United States. 
During the campaign, Biden called Putin a “thug” and said 
that Russia represented the greatest threat to the United 
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States. He has met Putin on several occasions and neither 
probably expects to have a cordial relationship with the 
other. Putin is the only major world leader to date who has 
not acknowledged Biden’s victory and state-run Russian 
media are repeating American conspiracy theories from 
those who believe that the election was “stolen.” This is per-
haps not the best way to begin the relationship with the in-
coming Biden administration. 
Officials	from	both	the	Obama	and	Trump	administrations	
have complained that, when they have approached it with 
an agenda for negotiation, the Kremlin has not been re-
sponsive. “They gave us no space” for discussion is a com-
mon refrain. Whether a Biden administration succeeds in 
engaging Russia on issues of mutual interest depends on 
how responsive the Kremlin will be.
The US-Russian relationship is worse today than it has been 
at any time since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. 
It will remain adversarial for the foreseeable future. But, 
under a Biden administration, relations with Russia could 
become more coherent and predictable and Russia could 
become a less toxic domestic issue. This alone would be a 
productive change from the last four years.
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Conclusions 
and Outlook  
for 2021
By András Rácz and Milan Nič
None of the challenges faced by Russia that were discussed 
in this report – either in domestic or foreign policy – could 
be	efficiently	addressed,	let	alone	solved,	in	2020.
THE TRAGEDY OF COVID-19
At present, the most pressing – and also tragic – chal-
lenge that Russian leadership is facing is the coronavirus 
crisis. While in January 2020, at the very beginning of the 
COVID-19	outbreak,	Russia	acted	efficiently	to	isolate	the	
first cases, later developments clearly got out of control. 
The harsh lockdown measures imposed in spring 2020 did 
not	manage	to	significantly	push	down	the	number	of	active	
COVID-19 cases, which remained above 160,000 during that 
time. Starting in late September 2020, the country has been 
hit by a devastating second wave; by the end of the year, the 
number of active cases reached 547,000. 
Russia’s official statistics for 2020 show a relatively low 
number of COVID-related deaths, with some 55,000 fa-
talities by the end of the year. This means that, compara-
tively, Russia fared a lot better than the United Kingdom, 
France, or Italy did in this regard – not to mention the stag-
gering data of more than 300,000 COVID-related deaths in 
the United States in that same period. Meanwhile, there has 
been plenty of criticism about the reliability of Russia’s sta-
tistics as well as its methodology of reporting to the WHO. 
Russian statistics were mostly based on a substantial, unex-
pected growth in yearly death cases compared to the previ-
ous years, reaching some 220,000 fatalities. According to a 
68  Levada Center, “Bolshinstvo rossiyskikh vrachey ne doveryayut ofitsialnoy statistike po koronavirusu” [Majority of Russian doctors does not believe the official coronavirus 
statistics], July 7, 2020:  
<https://www.levada.ru/2020/07/07/bolshinstvo-rossijskih-vrachej-ne-doveryayut-ofitsialnoj-statistike-po-koronavirusu/> (accessed January 4, 2021).
69  Government of Russia, “Brifing Tatiany Golikovoy” [Briefing of Tatiana Golikova], December 28, 2020: <http://government.ru/news/41238/> (accessed January 4, 2021).
70  “Koronavirus: strakhi i vaktsina” [Coronavirus: fears and vaccine], December 28, 2020:  
<https://www.levada.ru/2020/12/28/koronavirus-strahi-i-vaktsina/> (accessed January 4, 2021).
71  “Rossiya planiruet proizvesti 30 millionov doz vaktsini ‘Sputnik V’ k yuniyu” [Russia plans to produce 30 million doses of the vaccine “Sputnik V” by June], RIA Novosti, 
December 24, 2020: <https://ria.ru/20201224/vaktsina-1590752775.html> (accessed January 10, 2021).
72  “Svishe milliona rossiyan privilis ot koronavirusa” [More than a million Russians got vaccinated against coronavirus], Lenta.ru, January 5, 2021:  
<https://lenta.ru/news/2021/01/05/priv/> (accessed January 10, 2021).
survey conducted by the Levada Center, more than 60 per-
cent	of	Russian	doctors	did	not	believe	the	official	coronavi-
rus statistics as of July 2020.68 Nevertheless, the Kremlin has 
adamantly kept arguing that the data has been accurate and 
Russia has been managing the crisis well.
This narrative was refuted by Deputy Prime Minister 
Tatyana Golikova on December 28, when she admitted69 
that some 81 percent of Russia’s excess deaths were re-
lated to COVID-19. Based on Golikova’s announcement, 
more than 186,000 Russians have died from the pandem-
ic in 2020 instead of the 55,000 that were reported earli-
er. This means that Russia’s real COVID-related death toll 
could be the world’s third highest, following the United 
States	and	Brazil.	Neither	the	official	numbers	nor	the	re-
porting methodology were adjusted after Golikova’s rev-
elation, however. And according to a survey conducted in 
mid-December 2020, while 57 percent of all Russians would 
be ready to get vaccinated against the coronavirus, only 38 
percent would be ready to get the Sputnik V vaccine devel-
oped by Russia.70
The staggeringly high number of fatalities, combined with 
an extremely low level of trust in the Russian-made vac-
cine, suggest that Russia’s prospect for getting the pan-
demic under control in 2021 is rather bleak. Shortcomings 
in vaccine production present another problem. As of De-
cember 24, 2020, Russia planned to produce some 30 mil-
lion doses of vaccine until June 202171 – a pace that is far 
from	sufficient	when	considering	that	Russia’s	population	
exceeds 140 million people. According to the head of the 
Gamaleya research laboratory, the producer of the Sputnik 
V vaccine, 100,000 doses are distributed every day.72 This 
means that, unless production can be massively upgraded, 
it	might	take	way	more	than	a	year	to	produce	the	suffi-
cient number of vaccines.
Relying on Western vaccines to bridge production short-
comings would mean a loss of prestige and political failure 
as the country moves toward State Duma elections that are 
due to take place no later than September 2021. Given that 
campaigning will be done amid a growing mood of protest 
across Russia, it is unlikely that the Kremlin will signifi-
cantly adjust its policies of managing the pandemic. Coop-
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eration with the West on joint vaccine production might, 
however, be a way forward.73
Meanwhile, it is important to note that Russia’s economy is 
faring relatively well despite the decline caused by the pan-
demic. Contrary to catastrophic forecasts from the begin-
ning of 2020, it had become clear by the end of the year 
that the Russian economy, although it took a hit, managed 
to avoid collapse. The overall slowdown is forecasted to be 
approximately 4 to 5 percent of GDP. Moreover, the mas-
sive reserves in the National Wealth Fund, which amount to 
nearly 180 billion USD, provide Russia with a cushion suf-
ficient	for	several	months,	should	economic	and	financial	
hardships prevail. Instead of using these funds to help the 
population	by	providing	widespread	benefits,	the	Kremlin	is	
further increasing the reserves – probably due to concerns 
about future US sanctions.74 The fact that Russia’s economy 
turned out to be relatively more resilient compared to ma-
ny Western economies might well reinforce Putin’s overall 
assessment that the Russian economic model is better than 
the liberal Western one.75 
INCREASING SELF-ISOLATION  
FROM THE WEST
All	in	all,	there	is	no	imminent	economic	or	financial	pres-
sure on the Kremlin to change its foreign policy course vis-
à-vis the West – particularly because 2020 has hardly been 
an easy year for Russian-Western relations. The victory of 
Joe Biden in the US presidential elections is likely to pave 
the	way	for	a	more	coherent,	more	principled,	and	signifi-
cantly more heavy-handed policy on Russia. This is particu-
larly likely to be true in light of the recently discovered and 
not yet fully understood hacking attacks against US govern-
ment servers. Yet, this policy may well be more predictable 
than that of the Trump era and even more cooperative in 
certain issues such as arms control. In the short run, how-
ever, this predictability is only likely to mean steadily cold 
relations, in which cooperation is limited to the most nec-
essary	fields,	including	a	limited	extension	of	New	START	in	
February 2021.
Still, any new agreements on arms control will be very 
difficult to reach. Many fundamental disagreements re-
main, including on engaging China and other nuclear pow-
73  Carlo Martuscelli, “Russia and Germany discussing joint vaccine production, Kremlin says,” Politico, January 5, 2021:  
<https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-germany-angela-merkel-vladimir-putin-coronavirus-vaccine-production-sputnik-cooperation/> (accessed January 10, 2021).
74  Natasha Doff, Evgeniya Pismennaya, “Putin’s Been Stingy With Stimulus Because of Sanction Fears,” Bloomberg, November 6, 2020:  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-06/covid-pandemic-putin-reluctant-with-stimulus-despite-russia-s-reserves?sref=9FMcma5m> (accessed January 12, 2021).
75  Kadri Liik, “Russia’s relative resilience: why Putin feels vindicated by the pandemic?”, ECFR Policy Brief, December 17, 2020:  
<https://ecfr.eu/publication/russias-relative-resilience-why-putin-feels-vindicated-by-the-pandemic/> (accessed January 12, 2021).
ers. According to Andrey Kortunov, Europe is moving into 
a very dangerous interim period. Although no legally bind-
ing US-Russian agreements in strategic arms control will be 
in place, new technologies will continue to allow more and 
more disruptive activities to shift to the cyber arena, space, 
or	artificial	intelligence.	
Meanwhile, Russia’s relations with Europe are now in a 
deadlock that is unlikely to be resolved soon. Relations were 
already	burdened	before	2020,	first	and	foremost	by	Rus-
sia’s illegal annexation of the Crimea and the war in eastern 
Ukraine, but also by various efforts to interfere in Europe-
an elections – including those in Germany – and tensions 
over energy supplies. However, the August 2019 murder of 
Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin’s Kleiner Tiergarten park, 
the newly emerged details about Russia’s hacking attack 
against the Bundestag, and, most importantly, the August 
2020 poisoning of Alexei Navalny worsened relations fur-
ther.	These	developments	inflicted	lasting	damage	on	the	
willingness of Germany – and also the EU – to actively strive 
for better relations with Russia as each side is only willing to 
engage in cooperation on its own terms. Russian leadership 
is losing interest in dealing with Europe and remains con-
vinced that time is on their side. 
In light of these developments, China remained Russia’s sole 
great power partner in international affairs. As of 2020, the 
cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is far from any kind 
of an established alliance. Instead, their cooperation is more 
based on temporarily shared interests – a kind of marriage 
of convenience – in which there are strong limits to mutu-
al trust, and both parties have only very limited willingness to 
take up any confrontation in support of the other. 
It is also a very asymmetrical partnership. The Chinese econ-
omy is more than seven times larger than Russia’s. Even if 
Moscow can offer geopolitical and strategic support, it can-
not do much to help China in economic terms, including in a 
trade war with the United States. For its part, the Kremlin is 
very careful not to fall too much into China’s embrace.
Nevertheless, under Presidents Xi and Putin, strategic coop-
eration between both powers is deemed to increase in im-
portance. China still needs Russia to gain a military edge and 
strategic depth for its policy of confrontation to Taiwan and 
over the islands in the South China Sea. Also, China sees the 
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opportunity to learn from Russia’s experience with military 
combat, cyber operations, and disinformation campaigns as 
an increasingly valuable asset. This may lead to the conclu-
sion that, in the near future, Europe may well experience 
more of such moves – primarily in the cyber and information 
domains – not only from Russia, but also from China. 
All in all, Russia’s increasing orientation toward China and 
efforts to build up a joint anti-American center of power in 
Eurasia is a longer-term phenomenon likely to last.
THE YEAR 2021 IS UNLIKELY  
TO BE ANY BETTER
By the end of 2020, it became spectacularly evident that 
Russia is not interested in maintaining good relations with 
the West if that would require Russia to make any signif-
icant concessions. Moscow has been increasingly refusing 
to conduct its foreign policy according to Western norma-
tive values; in fact, the joint rejection of these values serves 
as one of the cornerstones of its partnership with China. 
This is unlikely to change in 2021. Instead, domestic politi-
cal pressures resulting from the approaching Duma election 
make any concessions even more improbable.
There is also no reason to hope that Russia will stop its ef-
forts to interfere in the domestic politics of Western coun-
tries, as illustrated by the aforementioned large-scale 
hacking of US government servers that was recently discov-
ered and by several waves of COVID-related disinformation 
campaigns. Consequently, awareness needs to be main-
tained and resilience against hostile interference efforts 
further strengthened. This is particularly relevant in light of 
Germany’s upcoming Bundestag elections.
While some may argue that, because the sanctions adopt-
ed by the United States and European Union have, so far, 
failed to stop Russia from trying to interfere in the domes-
tic	affairs	of	Western	countries,	they	are	inefficient	and	un-
necessary, this is not the case. Sanctions, particularly those 
related	to	the	financial,	energy,	and	defense	industries,	have	
considerably increased the costs that Moscow needs to pay 
for rogue actions. While sanctions evidently did not deter 
Moscow from interference efforts, they considerably de-
graded the capabilities Russia may use for such purposes. 
Hence, sanctions need not be seen as a binary tool that ei-
ther fully works or fully fails, but rather as a tool that helps 
put pressure on an adversary.
All in all, similarly to the past year, 2021 is unlikely to bring 
any major improvement in relations between Russia and the 
West. Further worsening is, however, possible. The recent 
detainment of Alexei Navalny upon his return to Russia on 
January 17, 2021, may indeed lead to a further deterioration 
of EU-Russia ties and particularly those between Germany 
and Russia. This will be especially true if Navalny’s contro-
versial, yet suspended, sentence of three and a half years 
gets transformed into actual imprisonment.
If that happens, neither the EU nor Germany will have any 
other choice but to adopt further measures against Rus-
sia. After taking a hard stance on Navalny’s poisoning in the 
summer and autumn of 2020, both Brussels and Berlin are 
politically bound to continue standing up for him, simply 
for the sake of their own credibility. Potential punitive mea-
sures may include not only further personal sanctions, but 
also the possible freeze of construction on Nord Stream 2, 
particularly because it overlaps with the intentions of the 
Biden administration. Moreover, if Russian authorities im-
prison the most important opposition figure right before 
the Duma elections, it may raise the possibility of the EU 
not recognizing the results of that election at all. From the 
Kremlin’s perspective, however, domestic considerations al-
most always trump foreign policy costs; hence, it is unlikely 
that even the toughest EU measures would be able to deter 
Russia from imprisoning Alexei Navalny.
The likelihood of the further deterioration of relations with 
Russia leaves the EU and Germany with one remaining op-
tion. They need to intelligently manage the situation that is 
going to emerge when any improvement of strategic scale 
becomes out of reach in the short and medium term. This 
does not mean that occasional, issue-based cooperation 
should be rejected outright. Instead, questions related to 
global warming, environmental issues, and particularly the 
Arctic may indeed offer Russia an opportunity to willingly, 
honestly, and substantially cooperate. 
Handling the COVID-19 crisis may also constitute such an 
opportunity, depending on how successful Russia’s own 
vaccination efforts will be. If they do not meet expecta-
tions, widespread international cooperation might become 
necessary; the immunization of the Eurasian continent is 
not realistic unless the Russian population is provided with 
proper vaccines. However, it is important for both the EU 
and Germany to maintain selective engagement and avoid 
cross-topic concessions – for example, when a favor is 
granted in one sector to achieve progress in another. Prog-
ress in issues related to combating COVID-19 or climate 
Russian Foreign Policy in 2020: Strengthening Multi-vectorialism
31No. 5 | January 2021
REPORT
change must not result in weakened support for human 
rights and democratic freedoms.
Meanwhile, due to the upcoming Bundestag elections, Ger-
many can hardly afford the luxury of not paying both at-
tention and resources to increase its resilience against any 
possible outside interference efforts, including ones by Rus-
sia. Hence, an opportunity for improving Germany-Russia 
and EU-Russia relations may realistically only present itself 
after both the German and Russian parliamentary elections 
scheduled for September 2021. It is also likely that Moscow 
will wait for the next German chancellor to engage. 
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